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I. INTRODUCTION
The Constitution says precious little about treaties. In article II, the
"treaty clause" simply gives the President the "Power, by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Sena-
tors present concur."' In addition, article III extends the "judicial Power. . . to
all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under . . . Treaties made, or which shall
be made."2 These references to treaties are sparse probably because the fram-
ers' primary objective was to ensure that the federal government, not the states,
possessed authority over international agreements. That federalism
goal-helping to strengthen and improve the nation's foreign relations in a cen-
tralized government, thus avoiding the separate states' embarrassing interna-
tional forays under the weak Articles of Confederation3--could easily be ac-
complished by two final constitutional references to treaties: "No State shall
enter into any Treaty"4; and "all Treaties made, or which shall be made, ...
shall be the Supreme Law of the Land. ' 5 Nevertheless, the Constitution inade-
quately illuminates how the treaty power is distributed among the three federal
branches of government. As a former Assistant Secretary of State recently re-
marked to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: "I do not hold that the
treaty clause of the Constitution was the finest hour of the Philadelphia Con-
vention. [That clause] may not be the most unworkable provision of our funda-
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mental document, but its defects are serious. It is more check than balance...
"6
The past decade witnessed several significant separation of powers disputes
over important treaties. Mostly involving the President and the Senate, these
controversies have concerned both the interpretation and termination of treaties.
The treaty interpretation debate essentially concerns how much latitude the
President should be afforded in applying and enforcing international accords.
Disarmament agreements have been at the center of this debate. When Presi-
dent Reagan inaugurated the Strategic Defense Initiative ("SDI" or "Star
Wars"), many lawmakers claimed that the SDI's development and deployment
would be illegitimate under the Senate's original understanding of the 1972
Treaty on Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems ("ABM Treaty") 7 and would improp-
erly be based upon the President's reinterpretation of that Treaty.8 The reinter-
pretation dispute continued over the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-
range and Shorter-range Missiles ("INF Treaty")," to which the Senate saw fit
to attach the "Biden Condition." That Condition obligates the executive branch
to interpret the INF Treaty pursuant to the President's and the Senate's shared
and original understanding of the Treaty.10 After the INF Treaty entered into
force, however, President Reagan disavowed the Biden Condition as posing an
unconstitutional intrusion into executive authority.',
The -treaty termination debate concerns which branch(es) of the federal
government can constitutionally terminate treaties, given the Constitution's si-
lence about how to unmake treaties. This issue, more specifically, considers
whether the President may terminate treaties without the Senate's advice and
consent. Here, the paradigm for study is Senator Goldwater's challenge to Pres-
ident Carter's unilateral termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the
Republic of China ("Taiwan"),"2 when the United States shifted recognition to
the People's Republic of China ("PRC"). Although that case reached the Su-
preme Court, the Court did not rule on the merits of whether President Carter's
treaty termination was valid without senatorial consent.' 3
With each conflict over treaty interpretation or termination has come con-
gressional hearings, scholarly commentaries, and sometimes litigation concern-
ing the specific dispute at hand. What is usually missing, however, is a more
comprehensive vision of the treaty power; an effective and a unified solution to
all problems in the treaty process is still needed. This Article will demonstrate
6. Treaty Termination: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 284
(1979) (statement of William D. Rogers, Former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs) [here-
inafter Treaty Termination Hearings].
7. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, United States-USSR, 23
U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503 [hereinafter ABM Treaty].
8. See infra notes 53-77 and accompanying text.
9. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-range and Shorter-range Missiles, Dec. 8, 1987, United
States-U.S.S.R., 23 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1459 [hereinafter INF Treaty].
10. See infra notes 78-100 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
12. Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of China, Dec. 2, 1954,
6 U.S.T. 433, T.I.A.S. No. 3178 [hereinafter Mutual Defense Treaty].
13. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). See infra notes 104-36 and accompanying text.
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that the reinterpretation and termination controversies are actually interrelated.
This Article, moreover, contends that those current controversies are connected
to the much older debate about whether the President can constitutionally con-
clude certain international agreements without following the treaty clause's pro-
cedures. Still not resolved, that debate concerns the so called "executive agree-
ments," which Presidents from Washington to Bush have established with
foreign leaders. Although most executive agreements receive some congressional
approval, none are subjected to the rigorous demands of receiving two-thirds of
the Senate's consent; and certain executive agreements do not receive any con-
gressional acquiescence.1 The executive-agreement debate essentially involves
questions about making international compacts, and it is logical to link those
questions with questions about interpreting and terminating treaties; these ques-
tions together concern the nation's governance of international agreements. Sep-
aration of powers concerns--delimiting the treaty power within the tripartite
federal government-are equally and interdependently implicated by questions
about making, applying, and unmaking agreements. The federal government
can clarify and resolve the reinterpretation and termination controversies only if
it first untangles the executive-agreement controversy. If the executive branch is
guilty of unconstitutionally reinterpreting and terminating treaties, its chauvin-
ism may derive from the liberties it has historically taken by circumventing the
treaty clause in making executive agreements.
This Article's thesis is straightforward: Where article II of the Constitution
empowers the executive to govern exclusively over a particular topic, the Presi-
dent may unilaterally make, reinterpret, and terminate executive agreements
without any senatorial consent. Conversely, where article I gives the Congress
authority over a particular topic, or where articles I and II distribute authority
over that topic to both the Congress and the executive, the President must es-
tablish either a treaty with the Senate's consent or at least an executive agree-
ment with congressional authorization. In such cases, the President may neither
unilaterally reinterpret nor terminate that treaty or executive agreement. Al-
though others have concentrated upon the behavioral or functional nature of
making, applying, and terminating treaties,15 this Article instead focuses upon
the subject matter of specific agreements. It recommends a unifying "topical
approach" to resolve all disputed aspects of the treaty process. The starting
point for analyzing the reinterpretation and termination problems is whether the
President has the authority to create an executive agreement on a particular
topic without congressional authorization. Under a topical analysis, only if such
exclusive executive authority exists, can the President also unilaterally reinter-
pret and terminate those agreements.
Parts II, III, and IV of this Article, respectively, will examine executive
agreements, the interpretation of international agreements, and the termination
of international agreements. Linking those three topics together, part V will
elaborate upon and apply this Article's thesis.
14. See infra notes 18-50 and accompanying text.
15. See Infra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
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II. MAKING COMPACTS: THE EXECUTIVE-AGREEMENT DEBATE
As with the current issues of interpreting and terminating treaties, the dia-
lectics of executive agreements involve constitutional law, not international law.
Treaties and executive agreements equally bind the United States and other
nations in relation to each other under international law.1 6 Within the United
States and other domestic systems, each government has discretion over how to
establish and manage international agreements. 17 So the continuing controversy
over executive agreements is a matter of constitutional norms and the relations
between the political branches, not international norms and foreign relations.
This dichotomy of constitutional law and international law - the former regu-
lating the United States legal order, the latter regulating the world legal order
- is significant. For example, if the President creates an executive agreement
where the Constitution "requires" a treaty, the agreement is internationally
valid, even if constitutionally invalid. The reinterpretation and termination of
treaties and executive agreements may also cause contradictions between consti-
tutional commandments and international norms. Since the executive's creation,
application, and termination of international agreements will always have for-
eign relations implications, it is important that the President have a firm consti-
tutional basis for acting.
Assessing such Presidential authority initially depends upon whether execu-
tive agreements are constitutional. That analysis is particularly important to-
day, when more than ninety percent of the United States' international agree-
ments are not treaties, but befit one of three categories of executive
agreements:"' a "treaty authorized executive agreement," which is an agree-
ment that the President establishes with another nation pursuant to a treaty to
16. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 301 comment a
(1986) (whatever the designation of international agreements, "all agreements have the same legal status....")
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
art. II(l)(a), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 333 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980), U.N. Dc. A/CONF.39/27, reprinted in
8 I.L.M. 679, 681 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention], equally applies to treaties and executive agreements,
since its definition of "treaty" includes any "international agreement concluded between States in written form
and governed by international law .... " The Vienna Convention, which contains international norms regulating
treaty practices, including the obligation of nations to comply with their international agreements, is authoritative
in the United States. See RESTATEMENT, supra, at pt. III introductory note.
17. A nation's authority to make and regulate international agreements is inherently part of its sovereignty.
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, at § 302 comment a. Each nation may internally govern those agreements, just
as each nation has discretion about how to implement most international privileges and obligations: "In general, as
long as a state carries out its obligations, how it does so is not the concern of international law." L. HENKIN, R.
PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMnIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 140 (2d ed. 1987). Although the international and consti-
tutional systems are distinct-and although the current treaty controversies and this Article concern the latter
system-the government's handling of international agreements may certainly have international repercussions.
18. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCI SERVICE, 95th Cong., Ist Sess., INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: AN ANAL-
YSIS OF EXECUTIVE REGULATIONS AND PRACTICES 22-23 (Comm. Print 1977) (R. Majak). For example, between
1946 and 1972, 6.2% of the United States' international agreements were treaties; 5.5% were sole-executive
agreements; and 88.3% were congressional-executive agreements. Id. at 22. Those statistics do not include treaty
authorized executive agreements. The United States was a party to 906 treaties and 6,571 executive agreements
(primarily congressional-executive agreements) on June 1, 1983. See TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, S. REP. No. 205, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. at 38 (1984). For
background on executive agreements, see L. HENKIN, supra note 3, at 173-87; RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, at §
303 comments and reporters' notes; 14 M. WHITEMAN. DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 193-255 (1970); Rovine,
Separation of Powers and International Executive Agreements, 52 IND. LJ. 397 (1977).
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which the Senate earlier consented; a "congressional-executive agreement," to
which the President procures a majority of both Houses' consent, rather than
two-thirds of the Senate's consent, before or after making the agreement with
another nation; and, the most constitutionally problematic, a "sole-executive
agreement," which the President establishes with another nation without any
senatorial or congressional consent.
A. Treaty Authorized Executive Agreements
For even stalwart "congressional supremacists," treaty authorized execu-
tive agreements do not pose constitutional problems.' 9 In this context, the Presi-
dent originally received two-thirds of the Senate's consent when the initial com-
pact, the treaty, was created. So, the Senate essentially preapproved the
subsequent compact, the executive agreement; or the Senate may be viewed to
have delegated to the President the authority to make the executive agreement.
The President's adherence to the Constitution's treaty clause when originally
making the treaty validates the President's implementation of the executive
agreement. Treaty based executive agreements are also legitimate under the
President's power to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,"20 since
the term "Laws" in that passage includes United States treaties.2 ' The Supreme
Court has upheld the validity of a treaty authorized executive agreement.22
Questions have occasionally arisen about whether a treaty authorized a particu-
lar agreement.2 3 Those questions, however, do not involve constitutional law, but
present issues of treaty interpretation.
B. Congressional-Executive Agreements
The second genus of executive agreements includes compacts that the Pres-
ident creates pursuant to prior federal legislation; it also includes the more dis-
puted executive agreements that the Congress only later approves through legis-
19. For example, Professor Raoul Berger's article on executive agreements, The Presidential Monopoly of
Foreign Relations, 71 MicH. L. REV. 1 (1972), which epitomizes the congressional supremacists' criticism of
executive agreements for circumventing the treaty clause, does not even mention treaty authorized agreements.
See also infra notes 25-29 and accompanying text. This Article adopts the terms "congressional supremacists"
and "executive supremacists" to refer, respectively, to those observers who take prolegislative-branch or pro-execu-
tive-branch positions concerning the treaty power. Professor Berger and other congressional supremacists might
also be labeled "exclusivists," since, with the exception of treaty authorized executive agreements, they claim that
international agreements must exclusively be treaties, not executive agreements.
20. US. CO NST. art. II, § 3, c. 1.
21. This conclusion derives from the supremacy clause's designation of treaties as being part of federal law.
See US. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See generally Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MIcH. L.
REv. 1555 (1984).
22. E.g., Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957) (executive agreement that regulates criminal jurisdiction
over United States military in Japan was authorized by prior security treaty with Japan and thus valid). See 14
M. WmTs1.Em, supra note 18, at 229-33, for additional examples of valid treaty authorized executive agreements.
23. See, e.g., Murphy, Treaties and International Agreements Other than Treaties: Constitutional Alloca-
tion of Power and Responsibility Among the President, the House of Representatives, and the Senate, 23 U. KAN.
L RaV. 221, 227-29 (1974-75) (discussing 1971 debate between Senate and State Department about whether an
executive agreement with Portugal on stationing United States forces was authorized by NATO Treaty); Note,
Executive Agreements: Beyond Constitutional Limits?, I I HoFSTRA L. Rav. 805, 812-15 (1983) (discussing same
debate).
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lation or simply by joint resolution. 4 Congressional-executive agreements differ
from treaties and treaty authorized executive agreements in that they receive
the assent of the majority (not the two-thirds supermajority) of all members of
Congress (not just Senators). Congressional-executive agreements are also dif-
ferent in terms of timing, in cases where the Congress approves them after their
creation. Unlike treaty authorized executive agreements, congressional-execu-
tive agreements have generated much debate among scholars and government
officials.
One extreme interpretivist view holds that all compacts must be made ac-
cording to the treaty clause, and thus all congressional-executive agreements are
constitutionally invalid.25 The opposite noninterpretivist view holds that congres-
sional-executive agreements and treaties are entirely interchangeable, and thus
all such compacts are constitutional.2 8 At the heart of such polar positions is the
fact that the Constitution's treaty clause mentions only treaties and not any
other international compacts; nowhere else in articles I or II are the Congress or
the President expressly granted authority to make compacts other than trea-
ties.27 That fact, according to the interpretivists, means that the constitutional
text precludes the nation from entering binational and multinational agreements
without two-thirds of the voting Senators' consent. To read the Constitution
otherwise aggrandizes executive power, by permitting the President to evade the
treaty clause's demanding requisites; this is especially a problem when no prior
legislation authorizes the executive agreement. Congressional-executive agree-
ments may unduly enhance not only the President's power, but also the House
of Representatives' power. Pointing to The Federalist and to other historical
sources, the interpretivists argue that the framers intended to preclude the
"fluctuating" and "multitudinous" House from participating in treaty making.2 8
24. For examples of executive agreements approved by either prior or subsequent congressional action, see L
HENKIN, supra note 3, at 173-76; RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, at § 303 reporters' note 8; 14 M. \vmTmAN,
supra note 18, at 234-40; Note, supra note 23, at 815-22.
25. See Berger, supra note 19; see also Borchard, Treaties and Executive Agreements-A Reply, 54 YALE
LJ. 616 (1945) [hereinafter Borchard, A Reply]; Borchard, Shall the Executive Agreement Replace the Treaty?,
53 YALE LJ. 664 (1944) [hereinafter Borchard, Executive Agreement]; Note, Executive Agreements and the
Intent Behind the Treaty Power, 2 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 757 (1975). "Interpretivists" generally contend that
judges "should confine themselves to enforcing norms that are stated or clearly implicit in the written Constitution
." J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 1 (1980). Interpretivists may also be congressional supremacists.
26. The noninterpretivist view is epitomized by McDougal & Laos, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or
Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy (pts. 1 & 2), 54 YALE LJ. 181, 534
(1945), an extensive work, partly debating Borchard, Executive Agreement, supra note 25, followed by Borchard's
counterattack, Borchard, A Reply, supra note 25. The McDougal and Lans article "has become a bible for de-
fenders of executive agreements" and "did more than any other [article] to encourage wide use of executive
agreements. ... Berger, The President's Unilateral Termination of the Taiwan Treaty, 75 N.w. U.L. REv.
577, 628, 631 (1980). "Noninterpretivists" generally claim that judges "should go beyond [the constitutional] set
of references and enforce norms that cannot be discovered within the four comers of the document." J. ELY, supra
note 25, at I (footnote omitted). Noninterpretivists may also be executive supremacists.
27. See US. CONST. arts. I & IL Regarding the interpretivist versus noninterpretivist dispute over that fact,
compare Berger, supra note 19, at 4-7 and Borchard, Executive Agreement, supra note 25, at 678 and Borchard,
A Reply, supra note 25, at 618-21 (all arguing for the importance of the Constitution's omission of executive
agreements) with McDougal & Lans, supra note 26, at 216-26 (arguing that the Constitution's omission of execu-
tive agreements is unimportant).
28. Tim FEDERAIST No. 75, at 452 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). John Jay wrote that those favor-
ing a role for the House of Representatives in treaty making "seem not to recollect that such a body must necessa-
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Alexander Hamilton, as "Publius," has provided a much quoted stanza: "Accu-
rate and comprehensive knowledge of foreign politics; . . . a nice and uniform
sensibility to national character; decision, secrecy, and dispatch, are incompati-
ble with the genius of a body so variable and so numerous. '29 Constitutional
text and history alike thus counsel against congressional-executive agreements.
The noninterpretivists, on the other hand, cite to the constitutional clause
that prohibits states, without the Congress's consent, from "enter[ing] into any
Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a Foreign Power." 30 By
referring to international agreements other than treaties, that clause reflects the
framers' understanding that nontreaty international compacts may exist. The
noninterpretivists more generally oppose the interpretivists' "mechanical,
filiopietistic theory, [which] purports to regard the words of the Constitution as
timeless absolutes." 1 The noninterpretivists' position also draws upon the cur-
rent practice and necessity of creating congressional-executive agreements.
Given the plethora of often-mundane international accords that are needed in
modern foreign affairs, it is too burdensome and time consuming to follow the
treaty clause.3 2 Furthermore, in contrast to seeking just the Senate's consent to
a treaty, the majoritarian process flourishes when the entire Congress partici-
pates in authorizing executive agreements.3 3
Many scholars and government officials, however, articulate positions
somewhat between the interpretivist and noninterpretivist extremes.34 They rec-
ognize that congressional-executive agreements are a permanent fixture in the
nation's foreign relations; so they instead debate the proper criteria for distin-
guishing between accords that may be cast as congressional-executive agree-
ments and those that must be cast as treaties. The debate over the proper scope
of congressional-executive agreements is important because the Supreme Court
has put its imprimatur upon a few such agreements, but has not provided much
rily be inadequate to the attainment of those great objects, which [treaties] require to be steadily contemplated in
all their relations and circumstances ..... and the Constitution thus prudently reserves treaty making to Sena-
tors who, with longer elected terms, have "a sufficient time to become acquainted with our national concerns...
." THE FEDERALIST, supra, No. 64, at 391-92. Professor Borchard suggests that to "make the whole Congress
rather than the Senate a partner in the treaty making process assumes a radical change in the Constitution ... "
Borchard, A Reply, supra note 25, at 625, and the "argument [for] 'democracy'" through full congressional
participation contravenes the framers' intent and is simply "invalid." Borchard, Executive Agreement, supra note
25, at 663.
29. THE FEDERALsr, supra note 28, No. 75, at 452 (A. Hamilton).
30. US. CoNsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. See McDougal & Lans, supra note 26, at 221-22. The interpretivists,
however, contend: "[T]he fact that the Framers explicitly authorized the States to enter into 'agreements' but
omitted to do so in the case of the President implies a deliberate decision to withhold that power from him."
Berger, supra note 19, at 39-40 (footnote omitted).
31. McDougal & Lans, supra note 26, at 212.
32. See id. at 261-306. "[T]he constitutional practice. . . does not make available all the necessary proce-
dures" for making international agreements, id. at 186-87 (footnote omitted), and the executive branch "must be
able to canvass [the national body politic] promptly and efficiently . . , without being subjected to delays, ob-
structions, and disintegrating efforts by [senatorial] minorities .... " id. at 185-86, thus justifying executive
agreements.
33. L. HENKIN, supra note 3, at 175; McDougal & Lans, supra note 26, at 572-82.
34. See, e.g., Kuchenbecker, Agency-Level Executive Agreements: A New Era in U.S. Treaty Practice, 18
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1979); Miller, Dames & Moore v. Regan: A Political Decision by a Political Court,
29 U.C.LA L. REv. 1104 (1982); Murphy, supra note 23; Rovine, supra note 18; Comment, Approval of SALT
Agreements by Joint Resolution of Congress, 21 HARV. INT'L LJ. 421 (1980).
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general guidance for evaluating them.35 The Congress has initiated several as
yet unsuccessful efforts to regulate and control executive agreements.3 6
In the discourse over the latitude of congressional-executive agreements,
the State Department's "Circular 175"187 has gained most prominence. Circular
175 specifies multiple criteria that the executive branch considers in determin-
ing whether to pursue an international compact in the form of either a treaty or
an executive agreement. Those criteria are as follows:
a. The extent to which the agreement involves commitments or risks affecting the
nation as a whole;
b. Whether the agreement is intended to affect State laws;
c. Whether the agreement can be given effect without the enactment of subsequent
legislation by the Congress;
d. Past United States practice with respect to similar agreements;
e. The preference of the Congress with respect to a particular type of agreement;
f. The degree of formality desired for an agreement;
g. The proposed duration of the agreement, the need for prompt conclusion of an
agreement, and the desirability of concluding a routine or short-term agreement; and
h. The general international practice with respect to similar agreements.3 8
Those criteria are relevant to determine whether a treaty or any of the three
types of executive agreements is appropriate; but in practice, those criteria
mostly determine whether a treaty or specifically a congressional-executive
agreement is appropriate.39 Circular 175 elsewhere mentions the relevance of
considering whether the Constitution gives the President authority over the par-
ticular subject of an agreement;40 under this Article's thesis, that topical consid-
eration should control the form that an agreement takes. Circular 175's actual
criteria, however, do not sufficiently take into account whether a specific agree-
ment's topic falls within the Congress's article I power or the executive's article
II power.
35. E.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (upholding congressional joint
resolution authorizing executive to prohibit arms sales to particular nations); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892)
(upholding section of Tariff Act of 1890 authorizing executive to suspend exemptions on import duties); see also
Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. United States, 169 F. Supp. 268 (Cust. Ct. 1958), affd, 275 F.2d 472 (C.C.P.A. 1959)
(upholding Trade Agreements Act of 1934 authorizing executive to establish foreign trade agreements).
36. See Rovine, supra note 18; Note, supra note 23, at 835-42. The most noteworthy legislation is probably
the Case-Zablocki Act, 1 U.S.C. § 112(b) (1972), requiring the executive branch to convey all executive agree-
ments to the Congress within 60 days of their conclusion.
37. Treaties and Other International Agreements, Dep't of State Foreign Affairs Manual § 700 (1974)
[hereinafter Circular 175], reprinted in Congressional Oversight of Executive Agreements-1975: Hearings on S.
632 and S. 1251 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 279-301 (1975) [hereinafter Executive Agreement Hearings].
38. Id., § 721.3, at 284-85.
39. Although § 721.3 of Circular 175 reflects that those criteria help delineate among treaties and all genera
of executive agreements, certain criteria have special relevance to congressional-executive agreements (e.g., cri-
teria c and d) and most international agreements are cast as congressional-executive agreements. See supra note
18.
40. See Circular 175, supra note 37, § 721.2, at 284; see also § 721.3, at 285 (concluding provision after
criteria).
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C. Sole-Executive Agreements
Although accounting for a relatively small percentage of the executive
agreements, sole-executive agreements have caused a disproportionate amount
of theoretical and political controversy. Sole-executive agreements are anath-
ema to the interpretivists41 and may even give pause to some scholars who are
receptive to congressional-executive agreements.42 The notion of checks and bal-
ances, so important to the federal system, is inoperative when the President
creates a compact without the Senate's or the Congress's acquiescence. Some
sole-executive agreements have even been kept completely secret from the Con-
gress." Logically, under the proper topical analysis, the executive's unilateral
authority to conclude these agreements must draw upon the President's enumer-
ated powers found in article II of the Constitution." Sole-executive agreements
should be legitimate only when they concern a topic exclusively subject to Presi-
dential control. The federal government's approach to sole-executive agree-
ments, however, often is not predicated upon a topical approach.' 1 The Supreme
Court has impliedly approved the President's authority to compose sole-execu-
tive agreements, but it has not adequately defined, topically or otherwise, the
contours of that unilateral jurisdiction.'" To the extent that Circular 175 im-
pacts upon sole-executive agreements,' 7 its criteria, again, are not premised
upon a topical approach. 8 Legislation now obliges the President to report sole-
executive agreements to the Congress.' 9 But this and other legislative efforts,50
not based upon a topical approach, have generally failed to control and curb
sole-executive agreements. In short, the debate over sole-executive agreements
cries out for proper resolution.
III. APPLYING COMPACTS: THE REINTERPRETATION DEBATE
After treaties are made, they obviously must be applied and enforced. The
executive branch normally administers treaties, just as it executes all federal
laws. Given its role as the daily caretaker of foreign relations, 51 the executive
branch may particularly supervise the operation of compacts with other nations.
The Congress, however, may also help to enforce international agreements. For
41. See commentaries cited in supra note 25.
42. See commentaries cited in supra note 34.
43. See, e.g., Executive Agreement Hearings, supra note 37, at 164-67 (statement of Professor Falk, discuss-
ing the secret executive agreement between President Nixon and President Thieu of South Vietnam). Examples of
covert and overt sole-executive agreemcnts are given in L. HENKIN, supra note 3, at 176-84; M. WmTEmAN, supra
note 18, at 240-55.
44. See generally E. CoRwiN, THE PRESIDENT's CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 116-20 (1917); L. HEN-
KIN, supra note 3, at 176-84; REsTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 303 comment g; M. WMTEMAN, supra note 18, at
240-55; Note, supra note 23, at 824-28; infra notes 186-235 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 172-73 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 176-83.
46. See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937);
see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
47. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
48. See supra notes 38, 40 and accompanying text.
49. See supra note 36 regarding the Case-Zablocki Act.
50. See supra note 36.
51. See generally L. HENKIN, supra note 3, at 37-65.
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example, the Congress must pass whatever domestic legislation is necessary to
implement the treaty; and the Congress must provide whatever funding is
needed to fulfill the compact's goals. In addition, the federal judiciary has appli-
cative jurisdiction over treaties; its authority extends to cases arising under trea-
ties and other international agreements, since those compacts may present fed-
eral questions. 2 This sharing of the treaty power among the federal branches
has usually not posed difficulties.
The debate over the President's authority to interpret or reinterpret the
ABM and INF treaties, however, has critically shaken the Senate's and execu-
tive's relationship in governing treaties. For this Article's purpose, the issue is
not really whether the deployment of the SDI or of more conventional weapons
would violate the terms of those arms accords. That factual issue, on which
much of the existing literature has focused, involves the more pragmatic task of
treaty interpretation. This Article is instead concerned with analyzing the Sen-
ate's and the President's constitutional roles in interpreting treaties. That sepa-
ration of powers analysis also need not consider the pros and cons of Star Wars
or disarmament.
A. The ABM Treaty
The initial United States-USSR Strategic Arms Limitations Talks
("SALT I") produced the ABM Treaty. President Nixon and General Secre-
tary Brezhnev signed the ABM Treaty in 1972, when it received the Senate's
overwhelming consent and came into force.53 The Treaty limited the parties to
two ABM deployment areas each in their country (one in the nation's capital,
and one elsewhere), in a way that precludes the existence or development of a
national ABM defense.5" A 1974 protocol permits the parties only one deploy-
ment site each.55 At those sites, an ABM system, which is to "counter strategic
ballistic missiles or the elements in flight trajectory,"58 may contain only inter-
ceptor missiles, launchers, and radars, all of which are limited in number and
capability. 57 Adding to those significant restrictions, the ABM Treaty precludes
ABM systems that are not fixed and land-based. Article V(1) of the Treaty
provides: "Each party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems
or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-
based." 58
52. US. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. See generally L. HENKIN, supra note 3, at 205-24; K. RANDALL, supra
note 3, at 23-24, 59-89.
53. See ABM Treaty, supra note 7. See generally S. TALBOTT, ENDGAME: THE INSIDE STORY OF SALT II
(1980); T. WOLFE, THE SALT EXPERIENCE (1979).
54. ABM Treaty, supra note 7, art. III, 23 U.S.T. at 3440; see also Id. at art. 1, 23 U.S.T. at 3438.
55. Protocol to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, July 3, 1974, art. 1, 27 U.S.T. 1645, 1646, T.I.A.S. 8276.
56. ABM Treaty, supra note 7, art. II, 23 U.S.T. at 3439.
57. Id., arts. 11-111, 23 U.S.T. at 3439-40; arts. V-vI, 23 U.S.T. at 3441-42.
58. Id., art. V, T 1, 23 U.S.T. at 3441.
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After the ABM Treaty had been in force for over a decade, President Rea-
gan publicly announced the concept of the SDI.5 The SDI's goal, he said, was
to replace the cold war notion of mutual assured destruction ("MAD"). Under
MAD, the United States and the Soviet Union are each deterred from launch-
ing nuclear missiles against the other, due to the recognition and fear that the
other side would automatically retaliate with a nuclear response. 60 Instead of
resting national security "upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a
Soviet attack," why not "intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before
they reach[ ] our soil or that of our allies?,""' President Reagan asked in his
1983 Star Wars Speech. Totally shielding the nation, the SDI is supposed to
intercept and destroy incoming Soviet ballistic missiles by using several ad-
vanced and "exotic" weapons, including laser beams, particle beams, and ki-
netic-energy projectiles.62
For over two years, the Reagan Administration claimed that the Star Wars
concept complied with the ABM Treaty because the government was then in-
volved in only the project's "research" phase.63 Most observers both within and
outside the Administration agree that the Treaty does not preclude antiballistic-
missile research in even nonland-based modes.64 But should the research prove
successful, the United States would have to renegotiate the ABM Treaty before
"developing," "testing," or "deploying" the SDI, even the executive branch ini-
tially agreed.65
The Reagan Administration, however, later changed its tune, making two
different and new arguments. First, Government lawyers recommended that the
United States should withdraw from the ABM Treaty because the Soviet Union
had materially violated the accord. Domestic and international law permit the
United States to terminate or suspend a bilateral treaty, in whole or in part, if,
59. National Security: President Reagan's Address to the Nation, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 442 (Mar.
23, 1983) [hereinafter Reagan Address]. See generally T. LONGSTRETH. J. PIKE & J. RHINELANDER, THE IMPACT
OF US. AND SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS ON THE ABM TREATY, NATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO
SAVE THE ABM TREATY (1985).
60. See generally A. KENNY, THE LOGIC OF DETERRENCE 16-18 (1985); E. RHODES, POWER AND MADNESS
(1989); Panofsky, The Mutual-Hostage Relationship Between America and Russia, in NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND
NATIONAL SECURITY: POINTS OF VIEW 74 (R. Pranger & R. Labrie, eds. 1977).
61. Reagan Address, supra note 59, at 447.
62. See generally Guertner, What is Proof?, 59 FOREIGN POL'Y 73 (1985); Dep't of Defense, Defense
Against Ballistic Missiles: An Assessment of Technologies and Policy Implications 17-20 (1984); Fletcher, The
Technologies for Ballistic Missile Defense, I ISSUES IN SCl. & TECH. 15 (1984).
63. See Strategic Defense Initiative Progranv Hearing Before the House Comm. on Armed Services, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); Department of Defense Appropriations for 1986: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Defense Appropriations of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 569 (1985) (statement of
Gen. Abrahamson, Director of the SDI Organization) [hereinafter Appropriations Hearings].
64. See, e.g., Chayes & Chayes, Testing and Development of "Exotic" Systems Under the ABM Treaty:
The Great Reinterpretation Caper, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1956 (1986); Sofaer, The ABM Treaty and the Strategic
Defense Initiative, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1972 (1986). These authors (the latter inside the Administration, the former
currently outside) agree on little else.
65. See, Appropriations Hearings, supra note 63, at 652 (statement of Representative Dicks); id. at 723
(statement of Kent Stanberry, Director of Strategic Defense and Space Arms Control Policy); see also Kennedy,
Treaty Interpretation by the Executive Branch: The ABM Treaty and "Star Wars" Testing and Development, 80
AM. J. INT'L L. 854, 856-57, 859-62 (1986); Koplow, Constitutional Bait and Switch. Executive Reinterpretation
of Arms Control Treaties, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1353, 1368-70 (1989).
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in fact, the other party has committed a material breach.6 Some Republican
and Democratic observers alike believe that the Soviets may well have violated
the ABM Treaty.67 If the Senate and the President had actually investigated
this matter and together concluded that the Soviet Union had committed a ma-
terial breach, then the political branches could have debated the substantive
(rather than the constitutional) merits of developing, testing, and deploying the
Star Wars defense. The political branches, however, did not formally examine
the Soviets' alleged violations of the ABM Treaty; the Government did not pur-
sue the option of repudiating the treaty.
The executive was thus left with its second new argument, which led to the
serious and still ongoing rift between the Senate and the President. In 1985,
National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane announced the Administration's
new interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Under this reinterpretation, although
the Treaty bars the SDI's ultimate deployment, it does not prohibit the SDI's
development and testing.6 8 This reinterpretation cut against President Reagan's
initial statements and reassurances about Star Wars and the ABM
Treaty-that the Government would only research the SDI, in order to comply
with the ABM Treaty. 9 The reinterpretation also contravened the Senate's
1972 comprehension of the ABM Treaty.70 The Treaty's new meaning was
based upon an innovative reading of the Treaty's second article,7 1 and upon Mr.
McFarlane's debated use of an "Agreed Statement" appended to the Treaty.7 2
The reinterpretation also drew upon State Department Legal Adviser (and for-
mer Judge) Abraham Sofaer's use of a classified record of United States-USSR
negotiations over the Treaty.73 That record was kept secret during the Senate's
66. See Vienna Convention, supra note 16, art. 60, 8 I.L.M. at 701; RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 335.
67. See, e.g., The ABM Treaty and the Constitution: Joint Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations and the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 56 (statement of Senator Nunn), 133-34
(statement of Abraham Sofaer, Department of State Legal Advisor) [hereinafter ABM Treaty Hearings]. See
generally Gross, Negotiated Treaty Amendment: The Solution to the SDI-ABM Treaty Conflict, 28 HARv. INT'L
LJ. 31, 52-55 (1987).
68. See McFarlane Faults Soviet Arms Plan, Wash. Post., Oct. 7, 1985 at Al, col. 5; see also ABM Treaty
Hearings, supra note 67, at 203-18 (statement by Sidney N. Graybeal, former ABM Treaty Negotiator); R.
GARTHOFF. PouicY VERsus THE LAW: THE REINTERPRETATION OF THE ABM TREATY (1987); Biden & Ritch,
The Treaty Power: Upholding a Constitutional Partnership, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1529, 1530-36 (1989); Gross,
supra note 67, at 46-52.
69. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
70. See Biden & Ritch, supra note 68, at 1533-36, 1541-42; see also Chayes & Chayes, supra note 64, at
1957-61.
71. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. Article II defines an ABM system, which the Administration
interpreted to include the components that existed when the ABM Treaty was signed, but not necessarily to
include future components. The ABM Treaty thus does not regulate the SDI's components. Sofaer, supra note 64,
at 1974-77. But see Chayes & Chayes, supra note 64, at 1957-61 (disagreeing with that reading of article II,
which defines prohibited systems on performance basis, not technology basis).
72. ABM Treaty, supra note 7, Agreed Statement D, 23 U.S.T. at 3456. According to that Statement, in the
event that ABM systems become based upon physical principles other than those used in systems covered by the
ABM Treaty, they will be subject to U.S.-U.S.S.R. discussions; the Administration read the Statement to mean
that the Treaty does not presently regulate the SDI technologies. Sofaer, supra note 64, at 1975-78. Critics,
however, claimed that the Agreed Statement's implied reference to future technologies was limited to land-based
systems and not addressed to other basing modes. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 64, at 1961-63. See Kennedy,
supra note 65, at 861-62.
73. See Sofaer, supra note 64, at 1978-80. See generally Glennon, Interpreting "Interpretation'" The Presi-
dent. The Senate, and When Treaty Interpretation Becomes Treaty Making, 20 U. C. DAvis L. Ray. 913 (1987).
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advice and consent process. Judge Sofaer's defense of the reinterpretation was
connected with what has now been dubbed the "Sofaer Doctrine": "When [the
Senate] gives its advice and consent to a treaty, it is to the treaty that was
made, irrespective of the explanations it is provided" by the executive branch.
74
Hence, the explanations that the executive branch officers provide during the
Senate's hearing on a treaty are irrelevant to the treaty once it is in place,
unless perhaps the Senate explicitly confirms its understanding of a treaty
through one or more reservations or conditions to the accord. The Senate's orig-
inal understanding of a treaty is, by and large, inapposite to the President's
application of a treaty--even if the executive branch facilitated that original
understanding. Such is the case even when the executive branch causes the Sen-
ate to misunderstand a treaty by keeping a negotiating record from the Senate.
In Senate committee hearings on the reinterpretation controversy, Senator Jo-
seph Biden exclaimed to Judge Sofaer that this doctrine was "incredible" and
"absolutely staggering.''75 Under the Sofaer Doctrine, there is essentially no
utility in having executive branch officers testify before the Senate about a
pending treaty-since the executive is not bound by that testimony.
This Article's purpose, again, is not to examine whether the SDI's testing
and development would technically square with the ABM Treaty, with or with-
out the benefit of the Treaty's Agreed Statement or the secret negotiating rec-
ord. But, it is clear that both sides of the controversy recognized that the execu-
tive branch was, indeed, reinterpreting the Treaty. Even Judge Sofaer conceded
that he was advocating a new interpretation; his very thesis was that the execu-
tive branch is not bound by the Senate's original interpretation of a treaty. The
constitutional issue, then, is whether the President can unilaterally reinterpret
the ABM Treaty or any international accord, especially when the reinterpreta-
tion contradicts the Senate's understanding of the agreement during the ratifi-
cation process. Urging his colleagues to adopt a resolution against the Star
Wars reinterpretation, Senator Biden remarked: "First and foremost, this reso-
lution is about the Constitution. For never before has a President sought to
revise unilaterally and fundamentally the meaning of a treaty. '7' The constitu-
tional quagmire was sidestepped, however, for the time being, when the execu-
tive branch finally announced that it would adhere to the ABM Treaty's origi-
nal interpretation as a matter of Presidential policy, although it was not legally
or constitutionally required to do so.7
74. ABM Treaty Hearings, supra note 67, at 130 (statement of Abraham Sofaer, State Department Legal
Advisor).
75. Id. (statement of Senator Biden).
76. Id. at 177 (statement of Senator Biden). The "ABM Treaty Interpretation Resolution," S. RES. 167,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), reprinted in ABM Treaty Hearings, supra note 67, at 238 (sponsored by Senator
Biden), states that the Constitution requires the executive to comply with the interpretation existing during ratifi-
cation, unless the Senate consents otherwise. The full Senate did not consider that resolution. See Biden & Ritch,
supra note 68, at 1533-35.
77. The President decided not "to restructure the SDI program toward the boundaries of the broader reinter-
pretation which we were entitled to observe. The President made that decision as a matter of policy, not as a
matter of legal requirement, and clearly reserved the right to restructure the SDI program in the future ...."
ABM Treaty Hearings, supra note 67, at 475 (statement of Richard N. Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security).
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B. The INF Treaty
The controversy over Presidential treaty reinterpretation worsened with the
ratification of the INF Treaty. Signed by President Reagan and Secretary
Gorbachev in 1987 at their third summit, the INF Treaty seeks to eliminate the
two superpowers' intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles.7s This "double-
zero" goal will eliminate each nation's stockpiles of such land-based missiles in
geographic regions where the other party and its allies are most threatened. 9
Winning bipartisan support in the United States, the dismantling should reduce
the risk of nuclear attack without jeopardizing NATO security. The INF
Treaty will help further to thaw the cold war. The Senate gave its consent to
the new accord in 1988,80 but subject to a significant proviso.
Although most Senators agreed that the INF Treaty would be internation-
ally beneficial, they were concerned that the executive branch might eventually
reinterpret this agreement, just as it had the ABM Treaty. "The one legacy" of
the ABM Treaty debate that the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations re-
ported that it "could not overlook . . . was the Administration's constitutional
assertion of a clearly delineated and unprecedented doctrine under which the
President has wide latitude for treaty 'reinterpretation,' notwithstanding what
the Senate may have been told in the course of granting consent to ratifica-
tion."8 " The Committee Report continues that the Senate "was intent upon ad-
dressing and refuting this effort at executive enlargement of its share of the
Treaty Power.18 2 The Committee was not only looking forward to implementing
successfully the INF Treaty and other new treaties, but also "backward . . . to
a crucial constitutional provision established 200 years ago, which the Commit-
tee feels duty-bound to uphold and affirm."'83 Continuing their spirited denunci-
ation of the Sofaer Doctrine from the ABM-SDI battle, Senators Biden, Byrd,
and Nunn, among others, wanted the Reagan Administration's guarantee that
the doctrine would not be applied to the INF Treaty.
For its part, the executive branch tried to provide some assurances to the
Senate. Secretary of State George Shultz, in a letter to Senator Nunn, agreed
that the testimony of executive branch witnesses and submissions on the INF
Treaty "can be regarded by the Senate as authoritative;" that the meaning
presented by the executive branch to the Senate would be "authoritative with-
out the necessity of the Senate's incorporating that testimony and material in its
Resolution of Ratification through understandings, reservations, amendments,
or other conditions;" and that "the Reagan Administration will in no way de-
part from the INF Treaty as we are presenting it to the Senate."8 4
78. See INF Treaty, supra note 9. See generally SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS. THE INF TREATY.
S. Exac. REP. No. 15, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) [hereinafter INF TREATY REPORT].
79. See INF TREATY REPORT, supra note 78, at 11-22.
80. See 134 CONG. REC. S6937 (daily ed. May 27, 1988).
81. INF TREATY REPORT, supra note 78, at 89.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Letter from Secretary Shultz (Feb. 9, 1988), reprinted in id. at 442.
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Subsequent communications from the executive branch to the Senate, how-
ever, undercut Secretary Shultz's initial message.8 5 The executive branch not
only asserted that it was unable to bind later presidents with the Treaty's cur-
rent understanding, but that it was perhaps still wedded to the Sofaer Doctrine.
Arthur Culvahouse, President Reagan's Counsel, conceded that a treaty's inter-
pretation is binding when the executive shares that interpretation with the Sen-
ate, but only when that interpretation had been "authoritatively" communicated
and "clearly intended" by the President, and had been "generally understood
and relied upon" by the Senate during ratification.86 When those requisites are
not met, nothing impedes the President's discretion in later redefining a treaty's
meaning. According to the Senate, that restrictive view of a treaty's original
meaning smacked of Judge Sofaer's ideas.8 Although the Senate and the exec-
utive continued debating their proper functional roles in interpreting and apply-
ing treaties, they did not focus on the topic of the INF and ABM treaties -
disarmament; this Article will later demonstrate that a topical analysis is essen-
tial to the reinterpretation debate, just as it is to the executive-agreement
controversy. 8
Dissatisfied with the executive's position, particularly the increased promi-
nence of Mr. Culvahouse's viewpoint, the Senate eventually adopted the Biden
Condition to the INF Treaty Resolution of Ratification. 89 The Condition, which
Senator Biden drafted and Senator Byrd revised, reads: "[T]he United States
shall interpret the Treaty in accordance with the common understanding of the
Treaty shared by the President and the Senate at the time the Senate gave its
advice and consent to ratification."9 " That common understanding should be
based upon the INF Treaty's text; the Senate's resolution of ratification; and
the representations that the President and other executive branch officers pro-
vided to the Senate and its committees when seeking ratification consent. 1 The
Biden Condition also provides that the United States "shall not agree to or
adopt an interpretation different from that common understanding except pur-
suant to Senate advice and consent to a subsequent treaty or protocol, or the
enactment of a statute.192
The Reagan Administration criticized the Biden Condition. In the main,
Mr. Culvahouse claimed that the condition would "grant the Senate a role in
interpreting treaties not contemplated by the Constitution."9 " By requiring the
Senate's approval of the INF Treaty's reinterpretation, the condition "interferes
with the President's constitutional responsibility to interpret and implement
treaties and also constitutes an unprecedented arrogation of treaty power by the
85. See generally id. at 94-100, 443-46; Koplow, supra note 65, at 1376-78.
86. Letter from White House Counsel Culvahouse (Mar. 17, 1988), reprinted in INF TREATY REPORT,
supra note 78, at 443 [hereinafter Culvahouse Letter].
87. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
88. See infra notes 186-90 and accompanying text (topical analysis specifically of disarmament accords).
89. 134 CONG. Rac. 56724 (daily ed. May 26, 1988). See INF TREATY REPORT, supra note 78, at 96-100;
Biden & Ritch, supra note 68, at 1544-54.
90. 134 CONG. REc. 56724 (Condition A) (daily ed. May 26, 1988).
91. See Id. (Condition B).
92. See id. (Condition C).
93. Culvahouse Letter, supra note 86, at 444.
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Senate."94 Mr. Culvahouse asserted that the need for Senate approval "seem-
ingly would occur each time implementation of the treaty calls into question
any Executive statement in the massive ratification record." 95 Despite these ob-
jections to the Biden Condition, President Reagan exchanged ratification instru-
ments with Secretary Gorbachev.
Within about a week, however, President Reagan wrote to the Senate that
the Biden Condition "causes me serious concern." '96 "I cannot accept the prop-
osition that a condition in a resolution to ratification can alter the allocation of
rights and duties under the Constitution; nor could I. . .accept any diminution
claimed to be effected by such a condition in the constitutional powers and re-
sponsibilities of the Presidency. '97 The President wrote also that "the principles
of treaty interpretation recognized and repeatedly invoked by the courts may
not be limited or changed by the Senate alone . . ." and "the Supreme Court
may well have the final judgment, which would be binding on the President and
Senate alike." ' As one would expect, the Senate disagreed with President Rea-
gan's communication, not only on substantive constitutional grounds, but be-
cause the President had signed the INF Treaty with the Biden Condition at-
tached. 99 The Senate sought again to reassert its constitutional role in treaty
interpretation and to criticize the President's tactics in the ABM and INF
treaty debates. Since President Reagan said that he would not deviate from the
original INF interpretation, however, the difference of views on the Biden Con-
dition may not "have any practical effect on the implementation of the
Treaty."109 The constitutional dilemma over treaty interpretation is thus now at
a stalemate.
IV. UNMAKING TREATIES: THE TERMINATION DEBATE
Termination is the final step in shaping the nation's treaty commitments.' 0'
The Constitution offers absolutely no express guidance about whether the Presi-
dent, the Senate, or the President and the Senate together can terminate trea-
ties and other compacts. Most international instruments contain provisions
about whether and how the parties may terminate those agreements. In the
absence of such a provision, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties may
provide "gap fillers" about terminating treaties.'0 2 Those treaty termination ve-
hicles, however, regulate the parties' international relationship in renouncing
treaties. Again, the relationship among nations, and the international law gov-
erning that relationship, is systemically distinct from the relationship between
the Senate and the President concerning the treaty power, which is governed by
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 24 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 779, 780 (June 13, 1988).
97. Id. at 780.
98. Id. at 780.
99. Reagan Assails Senate on Treaty Condition, N.Y. Times, June 11, 1988, at A6, col. 1.
100. 24 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 779, 780-81 (June 13, 1988).
101. See Treaty Termination Hearings, supra note 6, at 390-91 (statement of Professor Michael Reisman)
(describing the termination sequence in the overall shaping of agreements).
102. See Vienna Convention, supra note 16, arts. 54-57, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 344-45, 8 I.L.M. at 699-700.
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constitutional law."'3 So even if international law would permit the United
States to terminate a particular treaty, there remains the constitutional question
of which branch or branches may decide to unmake that treaty. The Constitu-
tion does not provide an explicit answer to that important question.
President Carter's repudiation of the United States' Mutual Defense
Treaty with Taiwan instigated the treaty termination controversy. The two na-
tions negotiated that Treaty in 1954 on the heels of the Chinese Revolution and
the Korean War. Reacting to the PRC's possible threat against Taiwan and its
Pacific territories, as well as the United States' Pacific territories, the Treaty
obligated the parties "to meet the common danger" in helping to defend each
other.1 0 4 The Treaty declared "that no potential aggressor [should] be under the
illusion that either [the United States or Taiwan] stands alone in the West Pa-
cific Area." 10 5 Created pursuant to the United States Mutual Defense Assis-
tance Act of 1949 ("Mutual Defense Act"),0' the Treaty also obligated the
parties jointly and separately to develop their defensive capabilities. 07 The
United States and Taiwan, in short, aspired "to strengthen their . . . collective
defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a
more comprehensive system of regional security in the West Pacific Area
.. .0. 8 The Senate gave its advice and consent to the instrument's ratifica-
tion, and the Mutual Defense Treaty entered into force in 1955.
Officials of both Taiwan and the PRC assert that they alone represent
China's true and legal government. During the 1970's, the United States, along
with the NATO allies, began to improve relations with the PRC. President
Nixon visited the PRC with much pomp, circumstance, and the wise objective
of normalized relations. 0 9 The PRC, however, would not agree to formal and
complete diplomatic recognition of the United States, unless our nation ended
its official relations with Taiwan, including the termination of the Mutual De-
fense Treaty. In 1978, given the long and stable relationship between the
United States and Taiwan, the Congress passed the Dole-Stone Amendment, 110
premised upon "the responsibility of the Senate to give its advice and consent to
treaties entered into by the United States.""' Part of the International Security
Assistance Act of 1978,112 the Dole-Stone Amendment provides: "It is the sense
of the Congress that there should be prior consultation between the Congress
103. Cf. supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text (discussing the dichotomy between the international and
constitutional systems concerning the creation of international agreements).
104. Mutual Defense Treaty, supra note 12, art. V, 6 U.S.T. at 436.
105. Id., preface, 6 U.S.T. at 435.
106. See Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-329, § 402, 63 Stat. 714 (1949).
107. Mutual Defense Treaty, supra note 12, art. II, 6 U.S.T. at 436.
108. Id., preface, 6 U.S.T. at 435.
109. See generally Pappas, The Constitutional Allocation of Competence in the Termination of Treaties, 13
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL 473, 473-76 (1981); Legal Implications of Recognition of the People's Republic of
China, 1978 PRoc. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 240; Scheffer, The Law of Treaty Termination as Applied to the United
States De-Recognition of the Republic of China, 19 HARV. INV'L L. 931, 937-44 (1978).
110. International Security Assistance Act of 1978, § 26(b), 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (1978) [hereinafter Interna-
tional Security Act].
111. Id.
112. International Security Act, supra note 110, Pub. L. No. 95-384, 92 Stat. 730 (codified in scattered
sections of 22 U.S.C.).
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and the executive branch on any proposed policy changes affecting the continu-
ation in force of the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954."'l
Two months later in 1978, President Carter announced that the United
States would cease to recognize Taiwan and would instead recognize the PRC
as China's legitimate and sole government.114 He also announced that the
United States would terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty, pursuant to article
X of the Treaty. Although that provision states that the "Treaty shall remain in
force indefinitely," it allows that "[e]ither Party may terminate it one year after
notice has been given to the. other Party." '115 The United States still maintains
cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with Taiwan; prior treaties
and executive agreements between the United States and Taiwan also remain in
force, save the Mutual Defense Treaty.11 In terminating that Treaty, however,
President Carter did not seek senatorial or congressional approval. He did not
comply with the Dole-Stone Amendment.
In a case called Goldwater v. Carter,"' members of both Houses of Con-
gress sued the executive branch. Suing in the United States District Court in
the District of Columbia, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief
to prevent the termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty. The plaintiffs alleged
that President Carter violated his duty to uphold United States treaties; that the
Constitution does not allow the President unilaterally to terminate treaties; that
article X of the Mutual Defense Treaty intends that the United States, not the
executive, is the "party" that may terminate the accord; and that President
Carter violated the International Security Assistance Act of 1978.118 The dis-
trict court initially dismissed the action for lack of standing, but without
prejudice.119 After the Congress had made sufficient legislative efforts to evi-
dence that it wanted to participate in terminating mutual defense treaties, the
district court then found that the Congress would suffer a sufficient injury if the
accord with Taiwan was terminated without congressional consent.1 20 Having
113. International Security Act, supra note 110, § 26(b), 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (1978).
114. Joint Communiqu6 on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the United States of
America and the People's Republic of China (January 1, 1979), 14 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. DOC. 2264 (Dec. 18,
1978).
115. Mutual Defense Treaty, supra note 12, art. X, 6 U.S.T. at 437. See 14 WEEKLY CoaMP. OF PRES. Doc
2266 (Dec. 15, 1978).
116. See 14 WEEKLY COMp. OF PREs. Doc. 2275 (Dec. 18, 1978). See generally Scheffer, supra note 109, at
937-42.
117. Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C.), rev'd per curiam, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc),
vacated and remanded with directions to dismiss, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). See generally D. ADLER. THE CoNsrTTU-
TION AND THE TERMNATION OF TREATIES 248-306 (1986); Henldn, Litigating the President's Power to Terminate
Treaties, 73 Am. J. INT'L L. 647 (1979). For a study of the various ways in which the United States has termi-
nated treaties, with or without legislative acquiescence, see Emerson, The Legislative Role in Treaty Abrogation,
5 J. LEGis. 46 (1978). That study actually shows that treaty termination practice has been inconsistent, although
that study's author, who was Counsel to Senator Goldwater, favors the Senate's participation in treaty termina-
tion. See also Termination of Treaties: The Constitutional Allocation of Power - Materials Compiled by the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 2d Seas. 1-21 (1978) (lists of withdrawals from U.S.
treaties).
118. See Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 701.
119. That dismissal, by Memorandum-Order dated June 6, 1979, was not published, but is discussed in
Goldwater, 481 F. Supp. at 950-56.
120. Goldwater, 481 F. Supp. at 950-56. The legislative evidence included senatorial proposals to that effect.
Id. at 953-55.
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upheld the plaintiffs' standing, and ruling that the case did not raise a nonjusti-
ciable political question,121 the district court ruled in the Congress's favor. Al-
though the Constitution and the case law is not dispositive of the treaty termi-
nation issue, the district court found: "Taken as a whole, the historical
precedents support rather than detract from the position that the power to ter-
minate treaties is a power shared by the political branches of this
government.'
22
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed.
Sitting en banc and issuing a per curiam opinion, the appellate court validated
President Carter's unilateral treaty termination on various constitutional
grounds.1 2 3 Since the court viewed "the issue before us so narrowly and in the
circumstances of this treaty," it viewed the case to be justiciable. 12 The court
noted that, when giving its advice and consent, the Senate did not expressly
reserve a role for itself in terminating the Mutual Defense Treaty. 125 Although
not "minimizing the role of the legislature in foreign affairs,"" 81 the court con-
cluded that the Constitution did not nullify the treaty termination procedure
followed by the executive in this particular instance.2 7 A dissenting judge,
strenuously arguing that the Senate has an inherent constitutional role in treaty
termination, would have affirmed the district court's decision.12 8
On an expedited basis, the United States Supreme Court considered the
Goldwater case without hearing oral argument. 2 9 The Supreme Court, how-
ever, did not provide any real substantive guidance about which branch or
branches of the federal government may terminate treaties. Articulating a very
expansive approach to the political question doctrine, Justice Rehnquist opined
that the court of appeals' judgment should be vacated and the case dismissed.3 0
The case was nonjusticiable "because it involves the authority of the President
in the conduct of our country's foreign relations and the extent to which the
Senate or the Congress is authorized to negate the action of the President."'13
But Justice Rehnquist could convince only three justices that the case presented
121. Id. at 956-58.
122. Id. at 960.
123. Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 697.
124. Id. at 709. Chief Judge Wright and Circuit Judge Tamm concurred in the result, but voted to vacate
the district court order and to dismiss the complaint because the appellees lacked standing. Id. at 709 (Wright,
C.J. concurring).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 716 (MacKinnon, C.J., dissenting from the result; concurring that appellees have standing and
that case is justiciable).
129. Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 996.
130. Id. at 1002-06 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). K. RANDALL, supra note 3, at 105-06, critically examines the
political question doctrine in Goldwater. For valuable critiques of the doctrine in general or in the foreign affairs
context, see Champlin & Schwarz, Political Question Doctrine and Allocation of the Foreign Affairs Power, 13
HoFSmRA L. REV. 215 (1985); Cole, Challenging Covert War: The Politics of the Political Question Doctrine, 26
HARV. INT'L LJ. 155 (1985); Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE LJ. 597 (1976); Tigar,
Judicial Power, the "Political Question Doctrine," and Foreign Relations, 17 U.C.L. L. REV. 1135 (1970).
131. Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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a nonjusticiable political question, while other justices adamantly disagreed.132
Two members of the Court concurred with the Rehnquist plurality's result to
dismiss the complaint, but not under the political question doctrine.13 3 Two
other members would have set the case for oral argument and plenary
consideration. 1
3
'
Only one member of the Court, Justice Brennan, voted presently to reach
the case's merits. Dissenting from the order directing dismissal, Justice Brennan
wrote that "[ihe constitutional question raised here [may be] prudently an-
swered in narrow terms," and "[t]he issue of decisionmaking authority must be
resolved as a matter of constitutional law, not political discretion . . . .1115 Jus-
tice Brennan's brief opinion would have affirmed the court of appeals' pro-exec-
utive judgment, "insofar as it rests upon the President's well established author-
ity to recognize, and withdraw recognition from, foreign governments."1 36 In
short, although only one justice (Brennan) favored the President on substantive
constitutional law grounds, the Congress lost its case. In January 1980, Presi-
dent Carter's termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty became effective.
Three principal arguments have been at the forefront of the treaty termina-
tion debate. These arguments have emerged from the district and circuit court
opinions in Goldwater, from the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations' hear-
ings on treaty termination, and from commentaries. 37 Not sufficiently focused
upon a topical analysis of particular compacts, these arguments do not ade-
quately answer the question of which federal branch or branches can constitu-
tionally terminate treaties.
A. The Sole Organ Argument
The executive supremacists argue that the President may terminate treaties
because the President is the nation's "sole organ" in foreign relations." 8 The
sole organ argument draws upon a term that Justice Sutherland once borrowed
from a speech by John Marshall before the House of Representatives regarding
132. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Stevens joined Justice Rehnquist's opinion. See Goldwa-
ter, 444 U.S. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justices Powell, id. at 998-1002 (Powell, J., concurring), and
Brennan, id. at 1006-07 (Brennan, J., dissenting), criticized the plurality's application of the political question
doctrine, as discussed in K. RANDALL, supra note 3, at 105-06. See also infra note 135 and accompanying text.
133. Justice Powell voted to dismiss the case as not being ripe for review, Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 997-98
(Powell, J., concurring), and Justice Marshall concurred in the result to dismiss without explanation. See id. at
996.
134. Id. at 1006 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part, joined by White, J.).
135. Id. at 1007 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan opined that Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962),
the Supreme Court's seminal political question decision, which he authored, did not render Goldwater nonjusti-
cable. See infra notes 251-53 and accompanying text.
136. Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1006 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan thus here makes passing refer-
ence to the Mutual Defense Treaty's topic. See infra notes 199-208 and accompanying text for a more extensive
topical analysis of mutual defense treaties, including disagreement with Justice Brennan's conclusion.
137. See generally Goldwater, 481 F. Supp. 949, rev'd per curlam, 617 F.2d 697, vacated and remanded
with directions to dismiss, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); Treaty Termination Hearings, supra note 6; commentaries cited
in supra notes 109, 117; infra notes 138-70.
138. See Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 706-07; Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dis-
miss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment, Goldwater, 481 F. Supp. at 949, reprinted in Treaty Termi-
nation Hearings, supra note 6, at 99 [hereinafter Defendants' Motion].
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an extradition matter. In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,'39
which upheld a joint resolution of Congress that authorized the President to
prohibit the sale of arms to certain countries, Justice Sutherland wrote: "In this
vast external realm, with its . ..manifold problems, the President alone has
the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. . . . As Marshall
said,. . . 'The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations,
and its sole representative with foreign nations.' ",140 The circuit court in Gold-
water quoted that "oft-repeated language" in justifying the "vitality" of the
President's foreign affairs power to terminate treaties.1 41
But any literal reliance on the sole organ phrase is misplaced in the treaty
termination setting, the congressional supremacists contend. Not only was Mar-
shall's statement made in a very different context, but Curtiss-Wright was a
case in which the executive had acted under a congressional delegation and not
unilaterally in foreign affairs.14" "Ironically, [Curtiss-Wright], which proceeded
from a congressional authorization, has been employed to tear down the author-
ity of Congress.' 4' As Professor Raoul Berger even more harshly puts it: "Rep-
etition cannot improve a nonjudicial dictum torn from context by a Jus-
tice-Sutherland-who has never been regarded as a shining legal light."' 44
The disagreement over the sole organ doctrine more generally concerns the
debate about the political branches' respective roles in foreign affairs. At the
constitutional convention, and in the famous debate between "Helvidius" and
"Pacificus" (Madison and Hamilton), statespersons argued about which branch
should possess the greatest foreign affairs power. 145 Although the President can
arguably claim more of that power under article II of the Constitution, the
Congress can surely claim significant foreign affairs power under article I.146
Even if the President is the chief executive of foreign policy, the congressional
supremacists demonstrate that the executive branch is not the nation's sole or-
gan, or the only relevant department, in formulating foreign relations.
If the President were the sole organ in treaty making, then the Constitution
would not have provided for the Senate's advice and consent role. The Congress
can also supersede treaties by passing subsequent preemptive or inconsistent
legislation., 7 In addition, the congressional supremacists point to the fact that
the Constitution was initially drafted to vest the treaty making power exclu-
sively in the legislative branch; only at a relatively late moment was the Presi-
139. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
140. Id. at 319, quoting Marshall, 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800) (emphasis added). For background on
Marshall's statement, see Berger, supra note 26, at 589-91.
141. Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 706-07.
142. See Berger, supra note 26, at 591; supra note 140 and accompanying text.
143. Berger, supra note 26, at 591.
144. Id. at 590.
145. See generally A. HAMmTON, THE LErrES oF PAcIrscus AND HELVIDIUS (reprinted 1976); Bestor, Re-
spective Roles of Senate and President in the Making and Abrogation of Treaties - The Original Intent of the
Framers of the Constitution Historically Examined, 55 WAsH. L. REv. 1, 73-106 (1979); Comment, Resolving
Treaty Termination Disputes, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1189, 1195-1201 (1981).
146. See generally L. HENKIN, supra note 3, at 67-88; K. RANDALL, supra note 3, at 17.
147. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 115.
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dent included in the treaty clause.14 That fact contradicts the notion of superior
Presidential authority to make, remake, or unmake international compacts with-
out Senate approval. The idea that the President's treaty power is not unilat-
eral, but shared, also draws famous support from Hamilton's The Federalist
No. 75: "The history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted opinion of
human virtue which would make it wise . . . to commit interests of so delicate
and momentous a kind, as those which concern its intercourse with the rest of
the world, to the sole disposal of. . . [the] President . . . ."I" Hamilton's in-
fluential observation obviously undercuts the sole organ argument for Presiden-
tial treaty termination.150
Unconvinced, however, the executive supremacists can point to the fact
that the framers eventually decided to insert the treaty clause in the President's
constitutional article (article II), not in the Congress's article (article I).151
That fact purportedly supports the executive's predominant treaty power. They
also take solace from Professor Louis Henkin's suggestion that "perhaps the
Framers were concerned only to check the President in 'entangling' the United
States .. ."15' in the making of treaties. "'[Dfisentangling," or unmaking
treaties, "is less risky and may have to be done quickly ... ."153 And "since
the President acts for the United States internationally he can effectively termi-
nate or violate treaties, and the Senate has not established its authority to join
or veto him."1 54 Unless effectively stopped, the executive remains the sole organ
in treaty termination, the executive supremacists conclude.
B. The Supremacy Clause Argument
The supremacy clause is the focus of a second argument between the con-
gressional supremacists and the executive supremacists. According to the for-
mer, since article VI of the Constitution makes treaties "the supreme law of the
land," the President may not terminate, but must enforce, treaties. 155 Treaties
are the equivalent of other federal laws in the hierarchy of United States law;15
as such, treaties should be repealed in the same way as other federal laws are
repealed-by a legislative enactment. Although the Constitution does not ex-
pressly advise about how to repeal federal statutes, it is assumed, under the
supremacy clause, that only legislative action can void a statute; the congres-
sional supremacists contend the same is true concerning treaties. Since the Sen-
ate's consent is needed to make treaties, that consent is also needed to unmake
148. See Berger, supra note 26, at 581-82. See generally Bestor, supra note 145, at 88-131.
149. THE FEDERALIr, supra note 28, No. 75, at 451 (A. Hamilton). See generally D. ADLER, supra note
117, at 89-93.
150. Hamilton is not, however, purely a congressional supremacist. Although he wrote that the treaty power
"partake[s] more of the legislative than of the executive character," he also thought that "it does not seem strictly
to fall within the definition of either of them." THE FEDERALIST, supra note 28, No. 75, at 450 (A. Hamilton).
151. See Defendants' Motion, supra note 138, at 100-01, 120-23. See generally, L. HENKIN, supra note 3,
129-71.
152. L. HENKIN, supra note 3, at 169 (emphasis added).
153. Id. (emphasis added).
154. Id. (footnote omitted). See also Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 704; D. ADLER, supra note 117, at 96-97.
155. US. CoNsT. art. VI, c. 2. See D. ADLER, supra note 117, at 101; Berger, supra note 26, at 597-98.
156. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 115, reporters' note 1.
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treaties. Actually, this prolegislative position might support the entire Con-
gress's participation in treaty termination, not just the Senate's participation.157
According to the executive supremacists, however, the supremacy clause
argument just "plays with words."'158 Professor Henkin has written that article
VI "is addressed to the courts, and principally for the purpose of declaring trea-
ties supreme in relation to state law and policy.' 59 Rather than supporting a
legislative role in treaty termination, article VI addresses federalism concerns,
not separation of powers concerns. Arguing for symmetrical treatment in the
repealing of federal statutes and treaties belies the inherent difference between
treaties and other federal laws. Treaties are international instruments, which
may not have any domestic implications, conclude the executive supremacists. 60
Especially if the President is the sole organ in international relations,' 6' the
executive branch may terminate international compacts, irrespective of the
supremacy clause.
C. The Removal Argument
The final major point of contention concerns an analogy that the executive
supremacists draw between treaty termination and the removal of executive of-
ficers. The same clause in article II of the Constitution empowers the President,
with the Senate's advice and consent, both to make treaties and to appoint
"Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, . . . and all other Officers
of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided
for."' 2 That clause does not expressly say how either treaties or executive ap-
pointments should be undone. In Myers v. United States,' the Postmaster
General, with President Wilson's approval, unilaterally removed an Oregon
postmaster, despite a statute that required senatorial consent to remove post-
masters. Favoring the executive branch, the Supreme Court invalidated that
statute, broadly deciding that the "power to remove. . . executive officers...
is an incident of the [President's] power to appoint them, and is in its nature an
executive power.' 6 4 Since Myers held that the Senate's consent to the removal
of executive officers is inappropriate, the executive supremacists argue, by anal-
ogy, that the Senate's consent to treaty termination is also inappropriate. Arti-
cle II explicitly requires the Senate's consent only to the making of treaties and
executive officer appointments, and, if senatorial consent is unnecessary to ter-
minate Presidential appointments, it is unnecessary to terminate treaties.
157. See D. ADLER, supra note 117, at 101. See generally Berger, supra note 26, at 620-22.
158. Henkin, supra note 117, at 653.
159. Id.
160. Id.; see also Defendants' Motion, supra note 138, at 138-39.
161. See supra notes 138-44 and accompanying text.
162. US. CoNs. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. See Defendants' Motion, supra note 138, at 123-25; see also Goldwater,
617 F.2d at 703-04.
163. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
164. Id. at 161.
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On the other hand, the congressional supremacists cite to the Supreme
Court's subsequent decision in Humphrey's Executor v. United States.6 " Presi-
dent Roosevelt had unilaterally removed a member of the Federal Trade Com-
mission "without assigning any cause therefor,"' 66 rather than acting under a
statute that allowed the President to remove a commissioner only "for ineffi-
ciency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office."',6 In Humphrey's Executor,
the Court ruled against the President because the commission's "duties are
neither political nor executive, but predominantly quasi-judicial and quasi-legis-
lative."' 8 Hence, the executive may not unilaterally remove even a presiden-
tially appointed official against the terms of a statute, when that official func-
tions in a nonexecutive capacity. The congressional supremacists not only cite to
Humphrey's Executor as having diluted and narrowed Myers, but generally ar-
gue against the analogy between terminating treaties and removing officers. As
Professor Berger puts it: "[T]reaty terminations go beyond [the President's] re-
lations to his subordinates; they affect our relations to other nations and are of
immediate concern to the people and to Congress."'69 He rhetorically asks:
"Who would assimilate termination of the North Atlantic Alliance to firing a
member of the Cabinet?"'' 0 Since the Supreme Court decided that Goldwater
was nonjusticiable, however, there has been no definitive judicial answer about
whether the executive or congressional supremacists are "correct" concerning
the removal argument.
V. A TOPICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TREATY POWER
The modern debates over treaty interpretation and treaty termination obvi-
ously need resolution. Those debates will continue to obstruct the federal gov-
ernment's ratification, implementation, and termination of significant treaties.
Numerous old and new treaties, having myriad foreign policy implications, are
in jeopardy. As former Secretary of State Dean Rusk warned, when testifying
about the Mutual Defense Treaty: "Here we are at the gates of that slippery
slope toward the impasse which could paralyze our constitutional system."''
Most observers have simply taken either a pro-Senate or a pro-President
view of these controversies. The congressional supremacists claim that reinter-
preting and terminating treaties exclusively involve legislative functions,1 2
while the executive supremacists claim that those acts exclusively involve execu-
165. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1934). See D. ADLER, supra note 117, at 95-96;
Berger, supra note 26, at 595-97.
166. Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 622.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 624.
169. Berger, supra note 26, at 595-96.
170. Id. at 596. See generally Bestor, supra note 145, at 23-30.
171. Treaty Termination Hearings, supra note 6, at 370-71 (statement of former Secretary of State Dean
Rusk).
172. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 19 (executive agreements); Biden & Ritch, supra note 68 (interpreting
international agreements); Berger, supra note 26 (terminating international agreements).
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tive functions.173 It is a mistake, however, to take rigid, functionalist approaches
to treaty interpretation and termination. The Constitution does not expressly
assign the interpretation and termination functions to either the Senate or to the
President. Both interpretivist and noninterpretivist arguments about these func-
tions tend to cancel each other out, as the previous sections have demon-
strated.1 74 Thie federal government will not resolve the reinterpretation and ter-
mination controversies by analyses supporting either the Senate's or the
President's functional domination of the treaty power.
In analyzing the treaty power, it is likewise a mistake to seek much guid-
ance from the Burger and Rehnquist Courts' separation of powers decisions.
These well publicized opinions have concerned the constitutionality of the fol-
lowing: The one House legislative veto;175 the Comptroller General's role under
the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act; 76 the Commodity Futures Trading Com-
mission's adjudication of state law counterclaims; 77 the independent counsel
sections of the Ethics in Government Act of 1979;111 and the United States
Sentencing Commission's Sentencing Guidelines." Most commentators have
correctly criticized those opinions as being hopelessly inconsistent. 80 The opin-
ions posit contradictory originalist and nonoriginalist views of separation of
powers, displaying very different levels of constitutional deference to the differ-
ent governmental actors under attack.' 8' The doctrinal deficiencies of these
cases render them unhelpful in examining any separation of powers problem,
including treaty interpretation and termination.
Indeed, the Supreme Court's separation of powers decisions may be partic-
ularly unhelpful in reconciling the treaty power. To the extent that these deci-
sions involve any acceptable organizing principle, the most recent cases argua-
bly rest upon the following premise: A federal actor violates the separation of
powers when it reduces or reassigns another branch's governmental functions in
173. See, e.g., McDougal & Lans, supra note 26 (executive agreements); Sofaer, Treaty Interpretation: A
Comment, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1437 (1989) (interpreting international agreements); Henkin, supra note 117 (ter-
minating international agreements).
174. See supra notes 24-49, 66-77, 81-100, 117-70 and accompanying text.
175. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1982).
176. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
177. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
178. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
179. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
180. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, A Paradox Without a Principle: A Comment on the Burger Court's Jurispru-
dence in Separation of Powers Cases, 60 S. CAL L. RaV. 1083 (1987); Elliott, Why Our Separation of Powers
Jurisprudence Is So Abysmal, 57 GEo. WAs. L. REv. 506 (1989); Redish, Separation of Powers, Judicial Au-•
thority, and the Scope of Article III: The Troubling Cases of Morrison and Mistretta, 39 DE PAUL L. REV. 299
(1989); Werhan, Toward an Eclectic Approach to Separation of Powers: Morrison v. Olson Examined, 16 HAST-
INGS CONSr. L.Q. 393 (1989).
181. See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 180; Lewis, Limits on Presidential Power, 49 U. PIr. L. REv.
745, 750-51 (1988); Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions - A Fool-
Ish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 488 (1987); Comment, Morrison v. Olson: Renewed Acceptance for a
Functional Approach to Separation of Powers, 16 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 603 (1989). "Originalism" and "non-
originalism" are roughly the equivalents of interpretivism and noninterpretivism. See supra notes 25-26. The opin-
ions generally take a rigid approach to the separation of powers when the Congress is the defendant, strictly
keeping the legislature within the confines of article I of the Constitution, (see, e.g., Chadha; Bowsher), but a
flexible approach when there is a noncongressional defendant (see, e.g., Mistretta; Morrison).
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order to enhance its own power over those functions." 2 But even if that organiz-
ing principle exists, it does not illuminate the treaty power debate, since the
Constitution does not expressly assign the reinterpretation and termination
functions to either the Senate or the President. The Supreme Court cases have
challenged governmental behavior that is generally recognized as being within a
particular branch's functional province; the cases concern whether a different
branch can perform or control that function.18 3 The treaty context, however,
raises the more basic question of which branch can constitutionally undertake
the function of interpreting and terminating treaties. The authority to perform
those treaty functions is not sufficiently recognized as being executive or legisla-
tive in nature. Hence, without more guidance from the Constitution about
whether the Senate or the President can reinterpret or terminate treaties, any
functionalist analysis of the treaty clause will only prolong the inconclusive bat-
tle between the executive supremacists and the congressional supremacists.
As an alternative to a behavioral or functionalist analysis, this Author rec-
ommends a topical analysis of the treaty power. The key is to determine
whether the legislative or executive branch has authority over the specific topic
at issue in a particular international agreement. The starting point for that in-
quiry is to clarify the constitutionality of executive agreements. After all, the
decision about whether a compact may be undertaken as a type of executive
agreement, rather than as a treaty, is the first step in the constitutive process of
forming the United States' international commitments. Decisions about inter-
preting and terminating agreements represent the second and third steps.8 4
Linking the ongoing controversy over executive agreements to the modern de-
bates over treaty interpretation and termination, this Author suggests that a
topical approach can effectively provide a comprehensive solution to all prob-
lematical aspects of the treaty process.
The topical analysis tries to avoid bias in either the Senate's or the Presi-
dent's favor. It tries objectively to decipher the legislative and executive
branches' foreign affairs powers under, respectively, articles I and II of the Con-
stitution. If article II gives the President authority over a specific international
topic-and if article I says nothing about that topic-the President may create
sole-executive agreements on that topic. It follows that the President can also
reinterpret or terminate such sole-executive agreements, without senatorial ac-
quiescence, since the President has exclusive jurisdiction over the topics of those
agreements. Hence, the President has unilateral authority to make, reinterpret,
182. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 693; Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 725. See generally Rosenberg, Congress's Prerog-
ative Over Agencies and Agency Decision Makers: The Rise and Demise of the Reagan Administration's Theory
of the Unitary Executive, 57 GEO. WAsH. L. REV. 627 (1989). To the extent that the separation of powers cases
are instead organized according to the particular institution being challenged, they do not possess a legitimate
organizing principle. See supra note 181.
183. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 686; Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 726. See generally Krent, Separating the Strands
in Separation of Powers Controversies, 74 VA. L. REv. 1253 (1988); Verkuil, Separation of Powers, the Rule of
Law and the Idea of Independence, 30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 301 (1989).
184. See supra note 101. Viewing the treaty power as part of a constitutive normative process draws upon
the jurisprudential theory of Professors McDougal, Lasswell, Reisman, and their associates. See generally Mc-
Dougal, Lasswell & Reisman, Theories About International Law: Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence 61,
in INTERNATIONAL LAW EssAYs (M. McDougal & W. Reisman eds. 1981).
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and break sole-executive agreements if those are limited to topics found in arti-
cle II. The executive supremacists might welcome that conclusion, although it
properly rests upon a topical, not a functional, analysis.
Sole-executive agreements, however, are illegitimate if they concern a topic
found in article I and not article II of the Constitution, or if they concern a
topic impliedly found in both articles I and II. In such instances, the Constitu-
tion requires some legislative governance of the topic. A treaty or at least a
congressional-executive agreement must be composed. Some interpretivists
might argue that only treaties are appropriate in those situations.185 But the
practice of creating executive agreements is probably too ingrained in our sys-
tem to stop it completely; and, as with treaties, the establishment of congres-
sional-executive agreements entails the legislative branch's participation, even if
the treaty clause is not strictly followed. Therefore, this Author will view con-
gressional-executive agreements as interchangeable with treaties. It is logical to
conclude, however, that, if a treaty or congressional-executive agreement, rather
than a sole-executive agreement, was necessary in the first place, the President
must seek legislative approval before reinterpreting or terminating that accord.
Consistency would require that two-thirds of the Senate should approve treaty
reinterpretation and termination, while a majority of both Houses should ap-
prove the reinterpretation and termination of congressional-executive agree-
ments. That process will ensure that the government remakes and breaks trea-
ties and congressional-executive agreements in the same way that it made those
instruments, thus guarding separation of powers concerns. Hence, congressional
participation is needed during the entire process of creating, applying, and ter-
minating treaties and congressional-executive agreements, since those accords
concern topics found in article II. Although certain congressional supremacists
have suggested the same conclusion, they did not rely upon the correct topical
analysis.
In sum, this Author proposes an alternative approach to the treaty power.
This topical alternative is necessary particularly because Circular 175 has not
resolved the executive-agreement debate; the Biden Condition has not resolved
the reinterpretation debate; and the sole organ, supremacy clause, and removal
arguments have not resolved the termination debate. Instead of asking, "Can
the executive unilaterally make, reinterpret, and break international agree-
ments?," the question becomes, "Which international agreements can the exec-
utive unilaterally make, reinterpret, and break?" Therefore, rather than engage
in the usual thrust and parry about whether the treaty process is exclusively an
executive or a legislative function, the next subparts, respectively, will apply a
topical approach to concrete treaty problems, and will make recommendations
about enforcing that approach.
185. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 19; Borchard, A Reply, supra note 25; Borchard, Executive Agreement,
supra note 25. See generally supra notes 25-50 and accompanying text. Treaty authorized executive agreements,
however, are not problematical.
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A. Applying the Topical Analysis
This subpart topically analyzes several categories of international agree-
ments, assessing whether the President requires congressional approval to make,
reinterpret, and terminate those accords. The categories are: disarmament
agreements; mutual defense and recognition agreements; humanitarian agree-
ments; and wartime military agreements. The first two categories include trea-
ties that this Article has previously discussed, while the latter two categories
include agreements not yet discussed.
1. Disarmament Agreements
The first category includes agreements that reduce, limit, or eliminate the
parties' arsenals of particular weapons. Although these agreements could be
created multinationally, they are normally bilateral accords that the superpow-
ers establish. The ABM and INF treaties exemplify this type of accord, but
future disarmament agreements are on the horizon.18
A federal statute requires the President to make either treaties or congres-
sional-executive agreements on the topic of disarmament; the statute bars sole-
executive agreements on that topic. The Arms Control and Disarmament Act of
1961 ("Disarmament Act"), 187 which established the United States Arms Con-
trol and Disarmament Agency as part of the executive branch, provides as fol-
lows: "[N]o action shall be taken . .. that will obligate the United States to
disarm or to reduce or to limit the Armed Forces or armaments . . . , except
pursuant to the treaty-making power of the President under the Constitution or
unless authorized by further affirmative legislation by the Congress .... ."88
Although no court has ever examined that provision's constitutionality, the Dis-
armament Act is valid. Article II of the Constitution does not give the President
exclusive jurisdiction over arms limitation. The President arguably has some
authority over that topic, as the army and navy's commander in chief.'89 Article
I, however, empowers the Congress to raise, support, and arm an army and a
navy. 90 Since the President, at best, shares, the disarmament authority with the
Congress, the Disarmament Act constitutionally precludes the executive branch
from creating disarmament accords without legislative participation. The Con-
stitution and the Disarmament Act say nothing explicit about the President's
ability to reinterpret and terminate disarmament accords. But if the President
does not have independent article II authority to make agreements disarming
the nation, the executive branch does not logically have any constitutional or
statutory right to remake or break those agreements.
186. See supra notes 54-100 and accompanying text regarding ABM and INF treaties. Presidents Bush and
Gorbachev discussed new disarmament accords at their June, 1990 summit. See Bush & Gorbachev Sign Major
Accords on Missiles, Chemical Weapons and Trade, N.Y. Times, June 2, 1990, at 1, col. 6.
187. Arms Control and Disarmament Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2551 (1988).
188. 22 U.S.C. § 2573 (1988).
189. US. CoNsT. art. 1 2, cl. 1.
190. US. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-16.
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Hence, under a topical analysis, legislative approval is necessary before the
executive reinterprets or terminates accords that the Disarmament Act man-
dates be undertaken as treaties or congressional-executive agreements. The
Reagan Administration thus acted unconstitutionally in asserting a unilateral
executive authority to reinterpret the ABM and INF treaties. Before the execu-
tive branch ever develops, tests, or deploys the SDI, and if it ever attempts not
to eliminate intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, the Senate must be
consulted. The same conclusion would apply if the President tries unilaterally to
reinterpret or terminate future disarmament accords.
2. Mutual Defense and Recognition Agreements
The second category encompasses both mutual defense agreements and in-
struments that concern the United States' recognition of foreign governments
and countries.19 1 The topics of mutual defense and recognition were symbioti-
cally linked in the debate over terminating the Mutual Defense Treaty with
Taiwan. Although the legislature should participate in governing the United
States' mutual defense, the executive impliedly has exclusive authority to gov-
ern recognition.
The fact that President Eisenhower sought the Senate's advice and consent
to the Mutual Defense Treaty may be important evidence that the executive
lacks unilateral jurisdiction over mutual defense. Indeed, whenever the Presi-
dent creates a treaty (or congressional-executive agreement) on mutual defense
or on any international topic, the President apparently concedes that article II
of the Constitution does not provide exclusive executive control over that topic
and that the legislative branch, under article I, must be consulted. That conces-
sion should preclude not only sole-executive agreements on mutual defense, but
should preclude the executive from unilaterally reinterpreting or terminating
any treaty on mutual defense, including the compact with Taiwan. After all, if
the President lacks independent article II authority to make accords on mutual
defense, how could the President have the topical authority to remake or break
those accords?
As described earlier, the government created the Mutual Defense Treaty
with Taiwan pursuant to the Mutual Defense Act.192 That post-World War II
statute required the President to enter a treaty or congressional-executive agree-
ment with any nation or group of nations that was to receive military and finan-
cial assistance. 193 The Congress's topical authority to pass that statute derived
from its power to raise, support, and arm an army and a navy; 194 to provide for
the nation's common defense and general welfare; 95 and even to declare war."9 6
As with disarmament agreements, article I of the Constitution provides congres-
191. See generally L. GALLOWAY, RECOGNIZING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS. THE PRACTICE OF THE UNITED
STATES (1978).
192. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
193. See id.
194. US. CONST. art. I, § 8, cis. 12-16.
195. US. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
196. US. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
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sional authority over, mutual defense agreements, even though article II
designates the President as the armed forces' commander in chief.19 7 Under a
topical analysis, therefore, President Carter needed senatorial approval to termi-
nate (or reinterpret) the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan, just as President
Eisenhower needed the Senate's approval to make that Treaty. President
Carter's unilateral termination of the Treaty was unconstitutional, as the dis-
trict court correctly held in Goldwater v. Carter.""
In disagreeing with that holding in Goldwater, both the appellate court's
opinion and Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion cursorily suggested that termi-
nating the Mutual Defense Treaty was proper under the executive's authority to
recognize foreign governments and countries."" According to the court of ap-
peals, "the Constitution gave the President full constitutional authority to rec-
ognize the PRC and to derecognize [Taiwan] ."200 The court also said that the
President "has authority as Chief Executive to determine that there is no mean-
ingful vitality to a mutual defense treaty when there is no recognized state."' 0'1
The recognition power impliedly comes from the President's authority to "re-
ceive Ambassadors and other public Ministers"''2 2 and perhaps from the author-
ity to "appoint Ambassadors [and] other public Ministers and Consuls."' 0 3 Ar-
ticle I does not afford the Congress any recognition power. Since the executive
branch possesses exclusive jurisdiction over recognition, the President may uni-
laterally make, remake, and break sole-executive agreements on that topic. The
Supreme Court has upheld sole-executive agreements that recognize new or
newly compatible foreign governments or countries. 04 So the appellate court
and Justice Brennan correctly suggested that the President has unilateral au-
thority over recognition agreements. The President may also govern topics that
are sufficiently related to the recognition power (e.g., sustaining cultural ties
between the nations, or compensating for prior commercial claims between the
nations' citizens205), since the Congress lacks authority over those subsidiary
topics.
The appellate court and Justice Brennan, however, were incorrect to con-
clude that the President's recognition power includes unilateral authority over
the topic of mutual defense. As demonstrated above, under article I of the Con-
stitution, the Congress at least shares military authority with the President.2
The Mutual Defense Act confirmed the sharing of that authority.20 7 As Profes-
sor Reisman has put it: Mutual defense treaties are "a very special species of
agreement . . . . They grew out of a very special complex of legislation after
the Second World War. They represent a very innovative [and] experimental
197. US. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
198. Goldwater, 481 F. Supp. at 949. See supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.
199. Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 707-08; 444 U.S. at 1006 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
200. Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 707-08.
201. Id. at 708.
202. US. CONsT. art. II, § 3.
203. US. CoNsr. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
204. See, e.g., Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); see also supra note 46 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 46, 116 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
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type of agreement between the two branches of the Government ... .1,208 The
executive's recognition power should not be unduly stretched to topics subject to
some congressional control under article I, including disarmament.
If terminating the Mutual Defense Treaty was necessary to the United
States' recognition of the PRC, President Carter should have consulted with the
Senate before terminating that Treaty. It is not anomalous to conclude that
President Carter could unilaterally recognize the PRC and withdraw recogni-
tion from Taiwan, but needed the Senate's consent to terminate the Mutual
Defense Treaty. Under a topical analysis, the executive has exclusive authority
over the recognition topic, but at best shares authority with the Congress over
the mutual defense topic. The United States, of course, does not have a mutual
defense arrangement with every nation that it has recognized. Recognition does
not normally involve such an arrangement, and, in those instances, the President
does not need senatorial input on recognition. But when recognition involves a
mutual defense arrangement, as it did with Taiwan, senatorial input is needed.
The real anomaly is to require the Senate's consent to make a mutual defense
accord, but not to unmake that accord. In short, the President's authority to
create, reinterpret, and terminate recognition agreements does not extend to
mutual defense agreements.
3. Humanitarian Agreements
The third category includes multinational agreements protecting basic
human rights during armed conflict and military occupation, such as the four
Geneva Conventions of 1949,209 and during peacetime, such as the Genocide
Convention.21 0 It also includes terrorism agreements, such as the Hostage Con-
vention211  and the Internationally Protected Persons Convention,212 and hi-
jacking agreements.21 3 All of these important instruments derive from the post-
World War II international condemnation of oppression, brutality, and vio-
208. Treaty Termination Hearings, supra note 6, at 388 (statement of Professor Michael Reisman).
209. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the
Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217,
T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
210. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277
(entered into force Jan. 12, 1951) [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. The Genocide Convention applies during
wartime as well as peacetime.
211. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 4, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1456, adopted by
G.A. Res. 34/146, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 39), U.N. Doc. A/C.6/34/L.23 (1979).
212. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationaly Protected Persons,
Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167, adopted by
G.A. Res. 3166, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10), U.N. Doc. A/Res/3166 (1974).
213. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971,
24 U.S.T. 565, T.I.A.S. No. 7570, 974 U.N.T.S. 177 (entered into force Jan. 26, 1973), reprinted in 10 I.L.M.
1151 (1971); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641,
T.I.A.S. No. 7192, 860 U.N.T.S. 105 (entered into force Oct. 14, 1971), reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 133 (1971).
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lence.21' As the new decade and new century unfold, these and other human-
itarian agreements will become increasingly significant.
Although the political branches have debated the ratification of the human-
itarian agreements, particularly the human rights accords, 21 5 there has not yet
occurred any controversy over the reinterpretation or termination of these
agreements. Nevertheless, in the future, perhaps the executive branch might
unilaterally try to reinterpret or terminate the humanitarian agreements, just as
it did with the disarmament and mutual defense accords. Such Presidential be-
havior could give rise to any number of hypothetical constitutional questions.
For example, could the President constitutionally reinterpret the Genocide Con-
vention, claiming that genocide is a political, and thus an unextraditable, of-
fense, contrary to the Convention's plain and accepted meaning? 216 Could the
President terminate the Hostage Convention without the Senate's consent? Or
if the Torture Convention,2 17 which the Senate is presently considering, is rati-
fied, could the President unilaterally reinterpret that instrument completely to
prohibit capital punishment, which would contravene the political branches'
current understanding of that instrument?21 " Could the President unilaterally
terminate the Torture Convention?
The answer to all of these hypothetical (but not necessarily improbable)
questions is no. In aspiring to protect human rights, the humanitarian agree-
ments all define and prohibit certain types of egregious conduct as being inter-
national crimes.219 The agreements permit each party to capture and prosecute
these international criminals, even when the prosecuting nation has absolutely
no direct jurisdictional connection with the alleged offense. 220 Since these in-
struments address a topic of criminal law, they are subject to congressional au-
thority, not just Presidential control. Article I of the Constitution specifically
empowers the Congress to "define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed
on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations." 221, That provision
affords congressional authority over pirates, once the most prominent interna-
tional criminals, and .their modern counterparts, human rights offenders and ter-
rorists.2 22 Congress has passed federal criminal legislation that implements the
humanitarian agreements. 223 Conversely, article II does not give the President
any authority over international criminals.
Under a topical analysis, therefore, the government must undertake hu-
manitarian accords in the form of either a treaty or a congressional-executive
214. See K. RANDALL, supra note 3, at 7-9.
215. See generally RESTATEmENT, supra note 16, pt. VII, introduction.
216. See Genocide Convention, supra note 210, art. VII.
217. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
adopted Dec. 10, 1984, adopted by G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doec. A/Res/
39/46 (1985), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984). This reprint of the Torture Convention is the draft form;
minor revisions are indicated in 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985).
218. See id. at art. 1.
219. See generally K. RANDALL, supra note 3, at 179-80, 187-89.
220. The agreements thus incorporate the universality principle of jurisdiction. See id. at 179-89.
221. US. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. The older term "law of nations" refers to international norms.
222. See IC RANDALL, supra note 3, at 165-69, 179-89.
223. See generally id. at 72-76.
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agreement, to ensure that the legislative branch governs international human
rights and terrorism. In fact, no significant sole-executive agreements exist on
the humanitarian topic; treaties almost always govern that topic. 224 In turn, the
Senate's consent is also necessary to reinterpret or terminate human rights and
terrorism treaties. The Senate's topical authority to reinterpret and terminate
humanitarian treaties flows from its power to help make those treaties.
4. Wartime Military Agreements
The fourth category includes military agreements that the United States
establishes during a declared war. The Constitution gives Congress the power to
declare war,225 and the War Powers Resolution prohibits the President from
introducing the armed forces "into hostilities, or into situations where imminent
involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances," unless
"pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or
(3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States .... 1,226
Often ineffective, that statute has provoked extensive debate.2 7 But rather than
address the merits of that debate, the following discussion will assume that the
President has properly introduced the armed forces into a particular situation; it
will only examine the President's constitutional authority to create, reinterpret,
and terminate military compacts while that situation exists. It will consider a
few hypothetical questions concerning wartime agreements, similar to the dis-
cussion of humanitarian agreements.
Could the President, without congressional authorization, agree with an
ally to pursue a particular military strategy? Could the President unilaterally
agree to trade prisoners of war with an enemy's leader? Could the President
unilaterally establish an armistice agreement? And could the President alone
reinterpret or terminate any of those agreements? The answer is yes to each of
those questions. Since the President is commander in chief of the armed forces
under article II of the Constitution, 228 the executive branch may govern the
topics of military strategy, war prisoners, and armistice. Although article I em-
powers the Congress to declare war and to raise and arm the military,229 it does
not permit Congress to oversee or implement military decisions once the troops
have been committed. 230 Every army and navy needs a single leader, and article
II exclusively designates the President to command the forces. Given the Presi-
dential power to make sole-executive agreements, whether written or oral, on
military matters, the executive is also topically entitled to remake or break
those agreements. The Constitution does not require the executive to consult
224. See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, pt. V11, introduction.
225. US. CONsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
226. 50 U.S.C. § 1541(b) (1982).
227. See generally Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act that Worked, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1379
(1988); Van Alystne, Congress. the President, and the Power to Declare War: A Requiem for Vietnam, 121 U.
PA. L. REv. 1 (1972); Note, Congress, the President, and the Power to Commit Forces to Combat, 81 HARv. L.
REv. 1771 (1968).
228. US. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
229. US. CONs-. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-16.
230. See generally L. HENKIN, supra note 3, at 50-54, 177.
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with the Congress when taking such action. Of course, within the confines of
national security, pragmatic and political reasons may occasionally convince a
President to communicate major military decisions to at least selected members
of Congress.
B. Enforcing the Topical Analysis
Applying a topical analysis, the prior discussion concluded that the Presi-
dent could unilaterally create, reinterpret, and terminate agreements involving
recognition and wartime decisions, but not agreements involving disarmament,
mutual defense, or humanitarian concerns. This final discussion considers how
the federal government could enforce those conclusions. It surveys several possi-
ble enforcement mechanisms: constitutional amendment; framework legislation;
conditions attached to specific statutes or international agreements; and judicial
implementation. The following discussions recommend that the government
should not try to amend the Constitution, but should illuminate the treaty
clause by passing framework legislation or by adopting statutory or treaty con-
ditions. The federal courts should also help to enforce the topical analysis, but
the standing requirement and the political question doctrine may unfortunately
impede that alternative. The goal, again, is to extinguish the treaty power de-
bate, with optimum cooperation among the federal actors.
1. Constitutional Amendment
Ratifying a constitutional amendment is the most extreme solution to the
nation's treaty problems. With virtually every controversy over executive agree-
ments, treaty interpretation, and treaty termination, there have been calls to
amend the Constitution in one way or another. 23 1 The proposed amendments
have usually fixated upon the discrete controversy at hand, without viewing the
overall treaty making process. Although one might try to compose a constitu-
tional amendment confirming the propriety of the topical approach, the task
would be cumbersome; the amendment would have to concern all aspects of the
treaty power. Unless the amendment precluded executive agreements, it would
have to delineate among the making, interpreting, and terminating of treaties
and all three categories of executive agreements. Furthermore, if the treaty
amendment were written as broadly as most constitutional provisions are, it
would not sufficiently answer the fact-sensitive issues that particular treaties
present on an ad hoc basis. Adding to these drafting problems are the immense
practical, political, and pecuniary burdens of ratifying any constitutional
amendment; witness the problems that surrounded both the equal rights and
231. See, e.g., Treaty Termination Hearings, supra note 6, at 327-28 (statement of Leonard Meeker); Sale,
Executive Agreements: A Survey of Legal and Political Controversies Concerning Their Use in US. Practice
(1975), reprinted in Executive Agreement Hearings, supra note 37, at 466, 478-88; Richberg, The Bricker
Amendment and the Treaty Power, 39 VA. L. REV. 753 (1953); Symposium, Should the Constitution be Amended
to Limit the Treaty Making Power?, 26 S. CAL L. REV. 347 (1953) (debating the Bricker Amendment); Trimble,
The Constitutional Common Law of Treaty Interpretation: A Reply to the Formalists, 137 U. PA. L. RaV. 1461,
1473-76 (1989).
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flag burning amendments. Wise statespersons have successfully argued against
various treaty amendments to the Constitution. 23 Hopefully, the same wisdom
will prevail in future debates about amending the treaty clause, even if an
amendment could entail a topical analysis.
2. Framework Legislation
The Congress could enact "framework legislation," instead of amending
the Constitution. Framework legislation, as Professor Casper puts it, differs
"from ordinary legislation in that it does not formulate specific policies for the
resolution of specific problems, but rather attempts to implement constitutional
policies. Both declaratory and regulatory in nature, it describes the constitu-
tional distribution of powers and regulates the decision making of the President
and the Congress." '233
Framework legislation could be a valuable and effective tool in enforcing a
topical approach to the treaty power. Unlike a constitutional amendment,
framework legislation could be sufficiently complex to provide detailed and spe-
cific guidance on the various issues that may surround various international
agreements. Working together, the legislative and executive branches should be
capable of creating comprehensive framework legislation concerning the entire
treaty process, including the creation, interpretation, and termination of treaties
and executive agreements. That legislation should be premised upon a topical
approach to the treaty power, based on this Article's thesis.2 3 4 In a sense, Circu-
lar 175 is a type of framework or declaratory legislation.2 3 5 Circular 175, how-
ever, suffers from multiple problems: it concerns only the making of interna-
tional agreements and not the remaking or breaking of those agreements; it was
not formulated with legislative input;2 6 and its criteria are wrongly functional-
ist, rather than topical, in nature. Hence, perhaps through bilateral congres-
sional and executive committees, the political branches should begin to draft
topical framework legislation to illuminate the treaty clause. As Professor Cas-
per further describes the general advantages of framework legislation: It "forces
both Congress and the President to focus on constitutional considerations, which
are ordinarily submerged in disputes concerning specific policies. [It also pro-
vides] institutionalized forms for consultation and the resolution of disagree-
m ents . . . .1,37
232. See supra note 231 and accompanying text; see also ABM Treaty Hearings, supra note 67, at 81-82
(statement of Professor Henkin); id. at 83-84 (statement of Professor Tribe); Treaty Termination Hearings, supra
note 6, at 375-77 (statements of former Attorney General Herbert Brownell and former Secretary of State Dean
Rusk) (discussing the need for flexibility in resolving specific treaty power disputes); 100 CONG. REc. 2364, 2364-
75 (1953) (debate over the Bricker Amendment); Perlman, On Amending the Treaty Power, 52 COLUM. L. REv.
825 (1953) (opposing the Bricker Amendment); Sutherland, Restricting the Treaty Power, 65 HARV. L. REv.
1305 (1952) (opposing the Bricker Amendment).
233. Casper, Constitutional Constraints on the Conduct of Foreign Defense Policy: A Nonjudicial Model,
43 U. C-ii. L. REv. 463, 482 (1976).
234. See supra notes 184-230 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
236. The fifth of Circular 175s eight criteria does consider the Congress's preference about what type of
agreement should be established.
237. Casper, supra note 233, at 482.
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3. Conditions Attached to Statutes or Agreements
The legislative branch could alternatively enact more specific statutes or
conditions to control the President's governance of particular international
agreements. Through statutes, like the Disarmament Act2"' and the Mutual De-
fense Act,239 the Congress can compel the President to create treaties or con-
gressional-executive agreements, rather than sole-executive agreements, on spe-
cific topics. By those same statutes, the Congress could require that it must be
consulted before the executive reinterprets or terminates the corresponding in-
ternational agreements. The Senate could also adopt a condition in its resolution
of consent to a particular treaty, mandating that its consent is necessary to the
President's reinterpretation and/or termination of that treaty. Of course, the
executive branch disavowed such a condition in the INF Treaty controversy. 2 0
Nevertheless, the legislative branch should still try to check the executive
branch through statutes or treaty conditions, particularly if framework legisla-
tion is not forthcoming. The legitimacy of these statutes and treaty conditions
depends upon a topical analysis. If the statutes and conditions restrict the Presi-
dent's creation, interpretation, and termination of agreements over topics that
are subject to congressional authority, then they are constitutional.2 4 1
4. Judicial Implementation
There is finally the option that the federal courts may implement a topical
approach to the treaty power. Constitutional litigation may involve the treaty
clause whether or not the Congress enacts new framework legislation or adopts
new statutory or treaty conditions. Although, as de Tocqueville wrote,
"[s]carcely any question arises in the United States which does not become,
sooner or later, a subject of judicial debate,"242 congressional plaintiffs face two
significant obstacles in any treaty case: the standing requirement and the politi-
cal question doctrine. Recall that both obstacles made it difficult for the con-
gressional plaintiffs to get their day in court in Goldwater.243 Commentators
have already written extensively about congressional standing24 ' and about the
political question doctrine in the foreign affairs context,24 5 making it unneces-
sary to add to that literature here.
Suffice it to say that a congressperson has standing to sue if the legislative
branch has suffered an institutional injury (for example, to its legislative pre-
rogative) and also if the individual legislator has derivatively suffered a substan-
238. See supra notes 187-90 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 192-97 and accompanying text.
240. See supra-notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
241. See generally supra notes 184-230 and accompanying text.
242. 1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY iN AMERICA 207 (H. Reeve trans. 1961).
243. See supra notes 117-20, 129-32 and accompanying text.
244. See, e.g., Henidn, supra note 117, at 649-51; McGowan, Congressmen in Court: The New Plaintiffs, 15
GA. L. REv. 241, 252-56 (1981); Note, The Burger Court's Unified Approach to Standing and its Impact on
Congressional Plaintiffs, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1187 (1985); Note, Should Congress Defend its Own Interests
Before the Courts? 33 STAN. L. REv. 715 (1981).
245. See supra note 130.
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tial injury to his or her ability to work in the Congress. 246 Especially if the
Congress passes framework legislation, or if it adopts statutory or treaty condi-
tions requiring its consent to make, reinterpret, or terminate specific interna-
tional agreements, 247 congresspersons will find it easier to satisfy the standing
requisite. Such statutes and conditions evidence that the legislature intends to
play a role in treaty governance, as in Goldwater.2 48 If the President violates
such legislation or conditions, the congressional plaintiff might successfully
demonstrate both an institutional and a derivative injury.
The political question doctrine might hinder plaintiffs even more than the
standing requirement in treaty clause cases. After all, four Supreme Court jus-
tices opined that Goldwater should be dismissed because it presented a nonjusti-
ciable political question.2 4 9 If the treaty termination issue is nonjusticiable, then
treaty interpretation issues are probably also nonjusticiable.2 50 On the other
hand, Baker v. Carr,251 the Supreme Court's leading decision on the political
question doctrine, emphasized that "it is error to suppose that every case or
controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance."2 52
And Justice Brennan, who wrote the Baker opinion, was one of the justices who
vehemently disagreed that Goldwater presented a political question.2 53 More-
over, several commentators, including the present Author, have generally criti-
cized the political question doctrine for lacking utility and keeping the courts
from properly hearing important cases.2 5 4 That criticism would also counsel
against applying the political question doctrine specifically in treaty clause
cases. Nevertheless, the Goldwater plurality opinion is probably a harbinger of
judicial inactivity in future cases challenging the President's creation, reinter-
pretation, and termination of international agreements. Although the federal
courts should not languish under the political question doctrine in those cases,
the Senate and the President will likely have to cooperate by themselves to en-
force the topical analysis, through either framework legislation or statutory or
treaty conditions. If such cooperative efforts do not occur, the treaty power con-
troversy may only worsen.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has proposed a topical approach to resolve the significant de-
bates over treaty interpretation and termination. Unlike functional analyses, the
topical approach provides a comprehensive appraisal of the treaty power, link-
246. See Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 433-36 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
247. See supra notes 233-41 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
250. In a treaty interpretation case, involving, for example, the ABM or INF treaties, the court would be
faced with a dispute between the political branches over both constitutional issues and the correct reading of an
arms accord. Recall, however, President Reagan's comment that the Supreme Court might eventually resolve the
dispute over the Biden Condition to the INF Treaty. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
251. Baker, 369 U.S. 186.
252. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211.
253. See supra note 135.
254. See supra note 130.
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ing together not only the reinterpretation and termination problems, but the
dispute over executive agreements. The topical approach -involving an assess-
ment of the President's and the Senate's respective foreign affairs powers under
the Constitution - is not wedded to the rigid viewpoints of either the executive
supremacists or the congressional supremacists. Instead, this Article suggests
that the political branches should cooperatively follow the topical approach in
the spirit of former Secretary of State Dean Acheson's wise advice: "The cen-
tral question is not whether Congress should be stronger than the Presidency, or
vice versa; but, how the Congress and the Presidency can both be strengthened
to do the pressing work that falls to each to do, and to both to do together.1255
255. D. ACHESON, A CITIZEN LOOKS AT CONGRESS 56 (1957).
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